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This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate finance.  Essay one examines 
whether corporate governance affects firm performance after capital investments.  I find 
that among firms with weak corporate governance, those with high abnormal capital 
investments have significantly lower stock performance than those with low abnormal 
capital investments.  In addition, a significant portion of the difference in abnormal stock 
performance between the two subgroups occurs around earnings announcements.  In 
contrast, the level of abnormal capital investments is not related to subsequent stock 
performance or earnings announcement returns at firms with strong corporate 
governance.  These findings indicate that corporate governance structure enhances firm 
value by mitigating the over-investment problem. 
Essay two examines how insider trading activity prior to seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) is related to subsequent investment, operating, and financing decisions 
of the issuer.  I find that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales issue more 
seasoned equity, hold more cash and increase dividend payouts more.  They also perform 
 vii 
more poorly.  Following the SEO, these firms also issue less equity and the effects of the 
SEO on their capital structures gradually reverses.  These findings suggest that SEO firms 
with more abnormal insider sales are more likely to have overpriced stock, while those 
with less abnormal insider sales are more likely to have good investment opportunities.  
Insider trading activity prior to the SEO provides valuable information about the firm’s 
incentives to issue seasoned equity and help to predict the real activities of the issuer 
following the SEO. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Conflicts of interest play an important role in corporate theory.  I study two 
important conflicts of interest in this dissertation; conflicts between managers and 
shareholders as they affect investment decisions and conflicts between insiders and 
outside investors as they affect the timing of equity sales. 
 
1.  ESSAY ONE 
Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between 
managers and shareholders.  An effective corporate governance structure could enhance 
firm value by aligning managerial interests with shareholders’ interests and by regulating 
managerial decisions. 
In the first essay of the dissertation, I examine whether corporate governance 
affects firm performance after capital investments.  I find that among firms with weak 
corporate governance, those with high abnormal capital investments have significantly 
lower stock performance than those with low abnormal capital investments; a significant 
portion of the difference in stock performance between the two subgroups occurs around 
earnings announcements.  In contrast, the level of abnormal capital investments is not 
related to subsequent stock performance or earnings announcement returns for firms with 
strong corporate governance.  On the other hand, among firms with a high level of 
abnormal capital investments, firms with weak corporate governance underperform firms 
with strong corporate governance; a significant portion of the difference in stock 
performance between the two subgroups occurs around earnings announcements.  In 
contrast, strength of corporate governance is not related to subsequent stock performance 
or earnings announcement returns for firms with a low level of abnormal capital 
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investments.  These findings indicate that corporate governance structure enhances firm 
value by mitigating the over-investment problem. 
 
2.  ESSAY TWO 
Corporate insiders have superior information about the firm’s value over 
outsiders.  When they believe that the firm’s shares are over-priced, they can take 
advantage of this inside information by issuing seasoned equity and selling their own 
shares. 
In the second essay of the dissertation, I examine how insider trading activity 
prior to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is related to subsequent investment, operating, 
and financing decisions of the issuers.  I find that SEO firms with more abnormal insider 
sales issue more seasoned equity.  Such firms do not make more investments; rather, they 
hold the extra proceeds in cash balance and increase dividend payouts more.  There also 
exists weak evidence that such firms tend to have worse operating performance and they 
issue less equity subsequently to reverse the effects of equity issuance on their capital 
structures.  These findings suggest that insiders have superior information about the firm 
value and they use this information to time both personal trades and public equity 
offerings.  Insider trading activity prior to SEOs provides valuable information about the 
firms’ incentives to issue seasoned equities.  In addition, insider information about the 
issuer’s valuation not only influences the firm’s decision to issue seasoned equity, but 
also has an impact on the firm’s real activities following the SEO.  Pre-issue Insider 
trading activity helps predict subsequent investment, operating, and financing decisions 
of the issuer. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents the 
first essay on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance after Capital Investments; 
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Chapter 3 presents the second essay on Insider Trading and Investment, Operating, and 
Financing Decisions of SEO Firms.  Each chapter contains sections on motivation, 
literature review, data description, empirical tests and findings, robustness checks, and 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2:  Corporate Governance and Firm Performance after Capital 
Investments 
1.  MOTIVATION 
Corporate governance of U.S. firms has changed dramatically in the last a few 
decades.  From the takeover and restructuring wave of the 1980s, to the rise of incentive 
compensation and institutional ownership throughout the 1990s, corporate governance 
seemed to play an important role in the development of U.S. corporations.  However, 
with the failures of Enron, WorldCom, and many other prominent companies in recent 
years, both industry practitioners and academic researchers are challenged harder than 
ever to understand the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
The corporate governance literature has examined the relation between corporate 
governance structure and firm valuation.  For example, previous studies find evidence 
that board structure, board size, and managerial ownership are associated with firm 
valuations.1  Recent studies of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009) and Cremers and Nair (2005) find that firms with fewer anti-takeover 
provisions are associated with higher firm values.  Given the evidence on the relation 
between corporate governance and firm value, it is a natural question to ask through what 
mechanism a strong corporate governance structure creates value. 
An effective corporate governance structure enhances firm value by aligning 
managerial interests with shareholders’ interests and by regulating managerial decisions.  
Three main types of decisions are subject to managerial discretion: investment decisions, 
financing decisions, and operating decisions.  While many studies have examined the role 
                                                 
1 See Weisbach (1988), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and Yermack (1996), among others,  
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of corporate governance through the second and third channels,2 this essay investigates 
the first channel through which corporate governance impacts firm value - investment 
decisions.  Specifically, this essay examines how a firm’s corporate governance structure 
is related to its stock performance following capital investments. 
I find that among firms with weak corporate governance, those with high 
abnormal capital investments significantly underperform those with low abnormal capital 
investments.  The difference in abnormal stock performance is 4.2% in the year following 
the capital investments, which is both statistically and economically significant.  In 
addition, a significant portion of the difference in stock performance between these two 
subgroups occurs around earnings announcements.  In contrast, the level of abnormal 
capital investments is not related to subsequent stock performance or earnings 
announcement returns for firms with strong corporate governance. 
On the other hand, among firms with a high level of abnormal capital 
investments, firms with weak corporate governance underperform firms with strong 
corporate governance.  The difference in abnormal stock performance is 3.1% in the year 
following the capital investments, which is both statistically and economically 
significant.  In addition, a significant portion of the difference in stock performance 
between these two subgroups occurs around earnings announcements.  In contrast, 
strength of corporate governance is not related to subsequent stock performance or 
earnings announcement returns for firms with a low level of abnormal capital 
investments. 
These findings provide evidence for the role of corporate governance structure in 
mitigating the overinvestment tendency of mangers and hence increasing firm value.  
                                                 
2 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2003) for comprehensive review of the 
empirical work on relation between corporate governance and various corporate decisions including capital 
structure, accounting reporting, CEO turnover and compensation, and product market competition. 
 6 
Furthermore, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the stock market under-
reacts to the agency problem of weakly governed firms. 
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
relation between corporate governance, investment decisions, and firm value.  Section 3 
describes the data and variables used in the analyses.  Section 4 discusses empirical tests 
and findings.  Section 5 describes robustness tests.  Section 6 concludes the essay. 
 
2.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, INVESTMENT DECISIONS, AND FIRM VALUE 
Corporations spend large sums of money in various capital investments.  For the 
period of 1990 to 2006, the average annual capital expenditures at U.S. firms equal to 
8.54% of annual sales.  Managers are the main capital investment decision makers, while 
it is well noted that they have their self-interests and do not always maximize 
shareholders value.3  Given the significance of capital investments and the discretion of 
managers in making such decisions, an important research question is how effective a 
firm’s corporate governance structure is in regulating the investment decisions made by 
the manager. 
One strand of the literature has examined the relation between corporate 
governance structure and managers’ decisions related to capital investments.  Richardson 
(2006) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) find that firms with weak corporate 
governance structures are more likely to invest more.  Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2008) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that weakly governed firms dissipate 
cash more quickly, primarily through acquisitions.  Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2006) find 
that investments of REIT firms are more closely related to investment opportunities for 
firms with high institutional ownerships.  These papers provide evidence that corporate 
                                                 
3 See Williamson (1964), Donaldson (1984), and Jensen (1986), among many others. 
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governance affects managers’ decisions related to capital investments.  However, an 
important question that remains unexplored is whether a firm’s corporate governance 
structure indeed has an impact on the quality of its capital investments and hence on the 
firm value in the long run.  This essay fills in this gap; it finds evidence that a strong 
corporate governance structure helps constrain managers from making bad investments, 
and hence enhances firm value and performance. 
Another strand of the literature studies the relation between capital investments 
and firm value.  While McConnell and Muscarella (1985) and Blose and Shieh (1997) 
find a positive reaction of the stock market to the announcement of significant capital 
investments, studies on the long term stock performance after capital investments, 
including Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Richardson and Sloan (2003), Xing (2008), 
Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006), Lamont (2000), and Polk and Sapienza (2009), find 
that firms with higher capital investments have worse long run abnormal stock 
performance subsequently.   
There are different hypotheses to explain this capital investment anomaly.  The 
first hypothesis is that agency problems exist and managers invest in bad projects to build 
up their empire.  The market under-reacts to such agency problems and the firm will have 
poor long run stock performance subsequently.  Consistent with this hypothesis, Titman, 
Wei and Xie (2004) find that the negative abnormal capital investments and return 
relation is stronger for firms with greater investment discretion (high cash flow and low 
debt ratio), and does not exist in periods where empire builders were subject to hostile 
takeovers.  An alternative hypothesis, however, is that the previous studies did not 
account adequately for changes in firm characteristics after capital investments and used 
incorrect benchmarks in calculating abnormal returns. 
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This essay helps to disentangle the two alternative hypotheses by relating a firm’s 
performance after capital investments to its corporate governance structure.  The 
evidence that the capital investment anomaly exists only for weakly governed firms 
favors the first hypothesis.  In addition, the analysis of corporate governance and earnings 
announcement returns following capital investments also lends strong support to the 
over-investment and under-reaction hypothesis of the capital investment anomaly. 
Several recent studies have explored the relation between corporate governance, 
corporate decisions related to capital investments, and firm value.  Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) find that value of cash is significantly lower for firms with weaker 
governance.4  They find that such firms dissipate cash more quickly in ways that 
significantly reduce operating performance; the results are robust after controlling for 
mergers and acquisitions.  They conjecture that firms with weak governance waste 
money on bad investments.  Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find that weakly 
governed firms with excess cash increases capital expenditures and acquisitions.  They 
also find that weakly governed firms with excess cash have lower profitability.  However, 
neither of these studies tests directly whether weakly governed firms with high 
investments have worse performance. 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find that acquirers with more anti-takeover 
provisions experience significantly lower announcement stock returns and make 
diversifying acquisitions with greater frequency.  My essay differs from their work in 
three aspects.  First, their paper studies acquisitions, while this essay studies general 
corporate investments.  Second, they use acquisition itself as a measure of 
overinvestment, while this essay constructs measure of abnormal corporate investments.  
                                                 
4 These findings are consistent with the evidence from Fauklkender and Wang (2006), which finds that the 
marginal value of one dollar cash is lower than a dollar.  In addition, Cross-country studies provide 
evidence consistent with that from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).  For example, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2006), and Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find that the value of corporate cash holdings is lower in 
countries with weaker investor protection. 
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Finally, they study stock returns around announcement date of acquisitions, while this 
essay studies long run accounting and stock performance. 
This essay examines how a firm’s corporate governance structure affects its stock 
performance and earnings announcement returns following capital investments.  Stock 
performance is a measure of market valuation and serves as a natural measure of firm 
performance.  Earnings announcement returns provides additional insight into any market 
mis-pricing of information contained in corporate governance and capital investment 
decisions.  In addition, if a significant portion of the difference in stock returns for firms 
with different corporate governance and amount of capital investments occurs around 
earnings announcements, then it is unlikely that such a difference is mostly driven by 
inadequate control of risks in measuring abnormal stock performance. 
The measure of corporate governance examined in this essay is an index of the 
degree to which managers can become entrenched, developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009) (the “Entrenchment Index”).  This Entrenchment Index is based on the 
number of takeover defenses.  I adopt the Entrenchment Index as the measure of 
corporate governance in this study for several reasons.  First, in theory, takeover defenses 
can shelter managers from the market for corporate control ex post, and hence may 
weaken their incentive to invest optimally ex ante.  As Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) argue, takeover defenses could cause higher agency costs “through some 
combination of inefficient investment, reduced operational efficiency, or self-dealing”.   
Second, the literature offers empirical evidence that takeover defenses are related 
to firm valuations.  Earlier event studies provide moderate evidence that certain anti-
takeover amendments reduce shareholder values.5  More importantly, several recent 
studies on firm performance over a longer horizon find that adoption of takeover defenses 
                                                 
5 See DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Ryngaert (1988), and Malatesta and Walking (1988). 
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are negatively correlated to firms’ stock performance.  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) develop the GIM Index, an index consisting of twenty four takeover defenses, and 
find that firms with less takeover defenses have higher firm value, higher profits, lower 
capital expenditures, and fewer corporate acquisitions.  Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2005) study six of the twenty four provisions used in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003), and find that it is this subset of six provisions, the components of the 
Entrenchment Index, that is driving the correlation between GIM Index and stock 
returns.6 
Third, the literature provides empirical evidence that takeover defenses are related 
to level of over-investment.  Richardson (2006) examines the association between 
corporate governance measures and amount of over-investment.  The evidence suggests 
that among a comprehensive list of corporate governance measures, only anti-takeover 
provisions and activist shareholders are significantly associated with level of over-
investment. 
Finally, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) find that underperformance of firms with 
high capital investments occurs only in periods where takeover activities were less 
prevalent.  This evidence suggests that takeover activities may alleviate the over-
investment problem.  It provides an additional motivation to use the Entrenchment Index, 
a set of takeover defenses, as a measure of corporate governance to study the relation 
between corporate governance, capital investments, and firm performance. 
 
3.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
                                                 
6 For more papers that use takeover defenses as a proxy for corporate governance, see Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2009), Cremers and Nair (2005), and Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2005), among many others. 
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3.1 Capital Investment 
Accounting variables, including capital expenditures, sales, book equity and total 
assets, are collected from Compustat. 
Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), level of capital investments is measured 
by the amount of capital expenditures divided by sales.  The implicit assumption 
inherited in this measure is that the expected amount of capital expenditures is 
proportional to sales.  The level of expected capital investments of a firm in a given year 
is calculated as the average level of its capital investments in the past three years.  The 
level of abnormal capital investments is calculated as the difference between the level of 
actual and expected capital investments.7  In the analysis of stock performance and 
earnings announcement returns, firms in the sample are sorted into five quintiles by the 
level of abnormal capital investments in a given year. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance Measure 
As discussed previously, the measure of corporate governance examined in this 
essay is the Entrenchment Index constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009).  
This comprehensive index consists of six provisions followed by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC): staggered boards, limits to amend by-laws, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes.  Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
find that firms with higher levels of the Entrenchment Index are associated with large 
negative abnormal returns, and the six provisions in the Entrenchment Index fully drive 
the correlation between the whole set of IRRC provisions and stock returns that was 
                                                 
7 In the section of Robustness Checks, I employ several alternative measures of capital investments and 
abnormal capital investments. 
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documented by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  The Entrenchment Index takes a 
value from zero to six; the higher the value, the weaker the shareholders rights and the 
more entrenched the management.8 
 
3.3 Performance Measures 
In this essay, I examine two different aspects of firm performance: monthly stock 
returns and earnings announcement returns in the year following the capital investments.  
I analyze how these firm performance measures are associated with a firm’s capital 
investment and corporate governance. 
 
3.3.1 Stock Performance 
Monthly stock return data are obtained from CRSP.  In analyzing how stock 
performance is associated with capital investments and corporate governance, it is 
important to take into account the difference in risks associated with firm characteristics 
such as size, book-to-market ratio, and prior stock returns.  The literature established 
empirical evidence on the association between such firm characteristics and cross-
sectional stock returns.  Firms with different levels of capital investments may be 
fundamentally different in such characteristics, and hence require different level of 
expected returns on their equity. 
I follow Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) to construct 
characteristics-based benchmark returns and abnormal stock returns for each individual 
firm.  Specifically, at the end of June each year, I form 125 portfolios based on three firm 
characteristics: book-to-market ratio, size, and momentum.  The value weighted monthly 
                                                 
8 IRRC follows the provisions only in years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004.  Following 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), for those years not recorded 
by IRRC, the information of the most recent preceding year with available provisions are adopted. 
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returns on the benchmark portfolios are calculated from July of the formation year to 
June of the following year.  Benchmark portfolios are rebalanced every year.  The 
abnormal stock return of an individual stock in a given month after the formation month 
is calculated as its raw return minus its benchmark portfolio’s return in that given month: 
Abnormal Stock Return i, t = Stock Return i, t – Stock Return benchmark, t  
 
3.3.2 Stock Returns around Earnings Announcement Dates 
Earnings announcement dates are obtained from the Compustat Quarterly 
Industrial Database.  Daily returns data around earnings announcement dates are obtained 
from Eventus. Cumulative annual earnings announcement return is calculated as the 
twelve-day cumulative stock return centered at the four quarterly earnings 
announcements dates (day minus one to day plus one around each announcement) in the 
year after the benchmark formation.  Consistent with the construction of abnormal stock 
returns, the abnormal cumulative annual earnings announcement return of an individual 
stock is calculated as the difference between the cumulative earnings announcement 
returns of the stock and that of its characteristics-based DGTW benchmark portfolio: 
Abnormal Cumulative Earnings Announcement Return i, = Cumulative Earnings 
Announcement Return i – Cumulative Earnings Announcement Return benchmark  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL TESTS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
The sample includes all Compustat firms with available data on corporate 
governance and capital investment.  The sample starts from 1990, when the IRRC data 
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become available, and ends in 2006.  Following the previous literature, I exclude firms 
from utility and financial industries (SIC codes between 4900-4999 and 6000-6999).  I 
drop firm-year observations where total assets or sales are below 10 million, or book 
equity is negative. 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics.  Panel A reports the number of 
observations, mean, and standard deviation of key variables.  The average firm in the 
sample has $5.5 billion of market equity, $10.0 billion of total assets, $4.1 billion of 
sales, and a market-to-book ratio of 1.75.   For the average firm, the amount of capital 
expenditures accounts for 8.54% of its sales, and the value of the entrenchment index is 
2.08. 
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the distribution of the Entrenchment Index – the 
measure of corporate governance examined in this essay.  There are 20,875 firm-year 
observations with available data on the Entrenchment Index.  The value of this index 
ranges from 0 to 6, where a value of 0 represents firms with the strongest shareholder 
rights and the least entrenched management and a value of 6 represents firms with the 
weakest shareholder rights and the most entrenched management.  The value of the 
Entrenchment Index is unevenly distributed across the range of 0 to 6, where 2 is the post 
frequent value (26.0% firm-year observations) and 6 is the most infrequent value (0.3% 
firm-year observations). 
Due to the imbalanced nature of the distribution of the Entrenchment Index, 
following the previous literature, I group firms by the value of the Entrenchment Index 
into three categories: (1) Low Entrenchment Group (with a value of 0 or 1); (2) Middle 
Entrenchment Group (with a value of 2); and (3) High Entrenchment Group (with a value 
between 3 and 6).  The advantage of the grouping is that it provides adequate number of 
observations in each category and makes the distribution across groups more balanced. 
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Panel C of Table 2.1 reports the correlation coefficients among key variables.  
The Entrenchment Index is positively correlated with abnormal capital investments; on 
average, firms with weaker governance are more likely to have a higher level of 
abnormal capital investments.  In addition, the Entrenchment Index is negatively 
correlated with market capitalization, market to book ratio, total assets, and sales; on 
average, firms with weaker governance are more likely to be smaller firms with lower 
market to book ratio. 
Panel D of Table 2.1 further examines the association between firm characteristics 
and the Entrenchment Index.  Consistent with Panel C, Panel D suggests that more 
entrenched firms are more likely to be associated with smaller market equity, total assets 
and sales, lower market-to-book ratio, and higher level abnormal capital investments.9  
The differences in these characteristics between the high and low entrenchment groups 
are statistically significant.  The evidence suggests that, as discussed previously, in 
measuring the stock performance of different firms, it is important to take into 
consideration the differences of firm characteristics.  The abnormal monthly stock returns 
and earnings announcement returns examined in this essay controls for differences in 
size, market-to-book, and prior stock performance. 
 
4.2 The Entrenchment Index and Abnormal Capital Investments 
As discussed previously, the literature provides evidence that the weaker the 
corporate governance structure, the more a firm invests, controlling for other firm 
characteristics.  As a first step, I test whether this result holds for the sample and measure 
of corporate governance examined in this essay. 
                                                 
9 It is interesting to see that the abnormal level of capital investments, which is the level of capital 
investments scaled by sales and then adjusted for historical level, is slightly negative for firms in the low, 
middle, and high entrenchment groups.  This means that overall the average level of capital investments 
scaled by sales was declining during the sample period. 
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As discussed previously, Panel D of Table 2.1 suggests that the average amount 
of abnormal capital investment for the high entrenchment index group is significantly 
higher than the amount for the low entrenchment group.  In addition, un-tabulated test 
suggests that among firms in the highest two quintiles of abnormal capital investments, 
those with high entrenchment have significantly higher level of capital investment and 
abnormal capital investments than those with low entrenchment. 
To examine the association between the Entrenchment Index and capital 
investments in a multivariate setting, I run multivariate regressions of the level of capital 
investments and abnormal capital investments on the Entrenchment Index, controlling for 
firm characteristics that are likely to be associated with the level of capital investments.  
These control variables include market-to-book ratio, book leverage, cash, firm age, total 
assets, past performance, and year dummies.  The regressions are clustered at firm level.  
The t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlations. 
Table 2.2 presents the results of these multivariate regressions.  The dependent 
variable of the first regression is the level of capital investments, and the dependent 
variable of the second regression is the level of abnormal capital investments.  Results 
show that firms with a higher value of the Entrenchment Index are more likely to invest 
more, after controlling for other firm characteristics.  This evidence is consistent with the 
findings from the previous literature.  It is interesting to note that the coefficients of the 
Entrenchment Index from both regressions are approximately 0.002.10  This suggests that 
the variation in the Entrenchment Index is associated with variations in the level and the 
abnormal level of capital investments of a similar magnitude.  Given that the standard 
deviation of the Entrenchment Index is 1.34, one standard deviation change in the 
                                                 
10 The coefficient of the Entrenchment Index from the capital investment regression is 0.0018563 (with t-
value of 3.79) and the coefficient of the Entrenchment Index from the abnormal capital investment 
regression is 0.0023970 (with t-value of 3.28). 
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Entrenchment Index results in a 0.27% change in level of capital investments and the 
level of abnormal capital investments.  This amount is around a 3.2% of the sample mean 
level of capital investments, which equals 8.54%. 
However, the evidence that more entrenched firms tend to invest more, by itself, 
does not necessarily indicates that such firms are more likely to make bad capital 
investments.  To reach the latter conclusion, I need to examine the firm performance 
following capital investments and relate the performance to the Entrenchment Index.  In 
the following sub-sections, I will analyze two different measures of firm performance: 
stock performance and earnings announcement returns. 
 
4.3 Stock Performance, Capital Investments, and Corporate Governance  
In this sub-section, I examine how monthly stock returns in the year following 
capital investments are related to the firms’ level of abnormal capital investments and the 
value of the Entrenchment Index.  Stock performance is a natural measure of firm 
performance following capital investments and a measure of market valuation of 
investment decisions. 
First, I study how stock performance is related to capital investments.  I sort firms 
into five portfolios (quintiles) based on the level of abnormal capital investments at the 
end of June each year, and calculate the value weighted monthly abnormal stock return in 
each month from July of one year to June of the following year.  Panel A of Table 2.3 
presents the results.  The first five rows report the mean monthly stock returns of the five 
portfolios based on the level of abnormal capital investment and the last row reports the 
difference in stock returns between the two lowest and two highest quintiles of abnormal 
capital investments. 
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Consistent with the previous literature including Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), I 
find that firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments underperform those with 
a low level of abnormal capital investments.  The mean abnormal monthly stock return is 
0.215% and 0.141% for the lowest two quintiles of abnormal capital investments, and -
0.140% and -0.014% for the highest two quintiles of abnormal capital investments.  The 
magnitude of the underperformance of the highest two quintiles of abnormal capital 
investments, compared to the lowest two quintiles, equals 0.255% per month or 3.1% 
annually, in the year subsequent to portfolio formation. 
Next, I study how stock performance is related to corporate governance.  As 
discussed previously, all sample firms are sorted into three groups based on the value of 
the Entrenchment Index.  The value weighted monthly stock returns are calculated for 
each group in every month in the year subsequent to portfolio formation.  Panel B of 
Table 2.3 reports the results.  Consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), more entrenched firms underperform less 
entrenched firms.  The mean abnormal monthly stock return is 0.082% for the low 
Entrenchment Index group and -0.062% for the high Entrenchment Index group.  The 
magnitude of the underperformance of high entrenchment firms, compared to low 
entrenchment firms, equals 0.144% per month or 1.7% annually, in the year subsequent 
to portfolio formation. 
Finally, I analyze how corporate governance and capital investments interactively 
impact stock returns.  In any given year, all sample firms are independently sorted into 
three groups based on the Entrenchment Index and quintiles based on the level of 
abnormal capital investments.  The value weighted monthly stock returns are calculated 
for each group based on these two dimensions in the year subsequent to the portfolio 
formation.  Table 2.4 presents the results.  The first three columns represent the low, 
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middle and high Entrenchment Index groups and the last column represents the difference 
between low and high Entrenchment Index groups.  The first five rows represent the 
lowest to the highest quintiles of abnormal capital investments, and the last row 
represents the difference between the lowest two quintiles and highest two quintiles based 
on abnormal capital investments. 
Findings from Table 2.4 suggest that firms with a high level of abnormal capital 
investments underperform firms with a low level of abnormal capital investments only 
among high entrenchment firms.  The magnitude of this underperformance for high 
entrenchment firms is 0.353% per month or 4.2% annually, in the following year.  This 
amount is both statistically and economically significant.  In contrast, the level of 
abnormal capital investments is not related to subsequent stock performance for low 
entrenchment firms. 
On the other hand, the underperformance of high entrenchment firms exists only 
among firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments.  The magnitude of this 
underperformance of firms with high abnormal capital investments is 0.256% per month 
or 3.1% annually, in the following year.  This amount is both statistically and 
economically significant.  In contrast, entrenchment is not related to subsequent stock 
performance for firms with a low level of capital investments. 
To examine whether the underperformance of firms with low entrenchment and 
high capital investments are robust when factor risks are accounted for, I run Fama-
Macbeth Regressions of the monthly stock returns of portfolios formed based on the 
abnormal capital investment quintiles and the Entrenchment Index groups on the Carhart 
(1997) four factors, i.e., the market factor, the size factor, the market-to-book factor, and 
the momentum factor.  Results are presented in Table 2.5.  The alpha of the low minus 
high abnormal capital investment portfolio is significantly positive (0.283%) for high 
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Entrenchment Index group; the corresponding alphas for low and middle Entrenchment 
groups are insignificant.  The alpha of the low minus high Entrenchment Index portfolio 
is significantly positive (0.347%) for the subset of firms in the highest two quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments; the corresponding alphas for other quintiles of abnormal 
capital investments are insignificant.  Table 2.5 suggests that the findings in Table 2.4 are 
robust after controlling for factor risks. 
To summarize, results in this sub-section confirm the findings in the previous 
literature on the existence of the underperformance in stock returns of firms with high 
capital investments and the underperformance for firm with strong corporate governance, 
respectively.  More importantly, this sub-section provides new evidence that the 
underperformance in stock returns after high investments exists only for weakly governed 
firms, and the underperformance of weakly governed firms exist only when the firms 
make abnormally high level of capital investments.  These findings are consistent with 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating the over-investment problem.  
They are also consistent with the agency hypothesis of the capital investment anomaly. 
 
4.4 Earnings Announcement Returns, Capital Investments, and Corporate 
Governance 
In addition to the analysis of monthly stock returns, I study how earnings 
announcement returns are associated with capital investments and corporate governance.  
The analysis of earnings announcement returns sheds light on the evolvement of market 
expectations.  More importantly, it helps to understand whether the findings on abnormal 
stock performance presented in the previous sub-section are real or due to benchmark 
errors.  If the findings are driven by benchmark errors, then there should exist no 
difference in subsequent earnings announcement returns, since benchmark returns should 
not change dramatically around earnings announcement days.  Alternatively, if 
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overinvestment by entrenched firms is what drives the findings in the previous sub-
section, there should be a significant difference in earnings announcement returns 
between firms with weak and strong governance that have invested an abnormally high 
amount; similarly, there should be a significant difference in earnings announcement 
returns between firms with low and high capital investments that are highly entrenched. 
First, I study how earnings announcement returns are related to prior capital 
investments.  I sort firms into quintiles based on the level of abnormal capital 
investments, for every year in the sample.  Then I calculate the value weighted 
cumulative abnormal returns in the twelve days around subsequent four quarterly 
earnings announcements following the portfolio formation.  Panel A of Table 2.6 presents 
the results.  The cumulative earnings announcement returns of the lowest two quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments are on average 0.137% higher than those of the highest two 
quintiles of abnormal capital investments.  However, the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
Next, I study how returns around earnings announcements are related to corporate 
governance.  Firms are sorted into three groups based on the value of the Entrenchment 
Index.  Then I calculate the weighted cumulative returns in the twelve days around the 
subsequent four earnings announcements.  Panel B of Table 2.6 reports the results.  Firms 
with high entrenchment have lower returns around earnings announcements than firms 
with low entrenchment.  The difference in returns in the twelve days around earnings 
announcements between the two groups is 0.328%.  However, this difference is not 
statistically significant. 
Finally, I study how corporate governance and capital investments interactively 
impact earnings announcement returns.  I independently sort firms according to the level 
of abnormal capital investments and the value of the Entrenchment Index.  The 
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cumulative announcement returns for each portfolio based on these two dimensions are 
reported in Table 2.7.  The first three columns represent the low, middle and high 
Entrenchment Index groups and the last column represents the difference between low 
and high Entrenchment Index groups.  The first five rows represent the lowest to the 
highest quintiles of abnormal capital investments, and the last row represents the 
difference between the lowest two quintiles and highest two quintiles. 
Findings from Table 2.7 suggest that firms with a high level of abnormal capital 
investments underperform firms with a low level of abnormal capital investments around 
earnings announcement days only among high entrenchment firms.  The magnitude of 
this underperformance for high entrenchment firms is 1.068% in the twelve days around 
the four quarterly earnings announcements subsequent to the portfolio formation; this 
accounts for as high as 25% of the difference in abnormal stock performance between 
those two subgroups in that year, which is 4.2% as suggested by Table 2.4.  This amount 
is both statistically and economically significant.  In contrast, the level of abnormal 
capital investments is not related to subsequent earnings announcement returns for low 
entrenchment firms. 
On the other hand, the underperformance in earnings announcement returns of 
high entrenchment firms exists only among firms in the highest two quintiles of abnormal 
capital investments.  The magnitude of this underperformance of firms with high 
abnormal capital investments is 1.042% in the twelve days around the quarterly earnings 
announcements subsequent to the portfolio formation; this accounts for as high as 34% of 
the difference in abnormal stock performance between these two subgroups in that year, 
which is 3.1% as suggested by Table 2.4.  This amount is both statistically and 
economically significant.  In contrast, entrenchment is not related to subsequent earnings 
announcement returns for firms with a low level of capital investments. 
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This evidence in Table 2.7 suggests that the underperformance of weakly 
governed firms that invested intensively is not driven by benchmark errors.  In addition, 
the market seems to under-react to the abnormal capital investments made by weakly 
governed firms and be surprised at subsequent earnings announcements. 
 
5.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
5.1 Sub-periods 
To examine whether the findings in the main analyses for the whole sample 
period of 1991 to 2006 hold for sub-periods, I perform the tests in Table 2.3 and 2.4 
separately for July 1991 to June 1999 and July 1999 to June 2006.   
Table 2.8 presents the results for the sub-period of 1991 to 1999.  Panel A shows 
that firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments underperform those with a 
low level of capital investments.  The difference in abnormal stock returns between the 
lowest and highest two quintiles of abnormal capital investments is 0.341% per month or 
4.1% annually, in the year subsequent to portfolio formation. 
Panel B shows that more entrenched firms underperform less entrenched firms.  
The magnitude of the underperformance of high entrenchment firms, compared to low 
entrenchment firms, equals 0.210% per month or 2.5% annually, in the year subsequent 
to portfolio formation. 
Panel C shows how corporate governance and capital investments interactively 
impact stock returns.  Consistent with the findings in the main analyses, firms with a high 
level of abnormal capital investments underperform those with a low level of abnormal 
capital investments only among entrenched firms.  The magnitude of this 
underperformance for high entrenchment firms is 0.463% per month or 5.6% annually, in 
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the following year.  This amount is both statistically and economically significant.  On 
the other hand, the underperformance of high entrenchment firms exists only among 
firms with level of high abnormal capital investments.  The magnitude of this 
underperformance of firms with high abnormal capital investments is 0.342% per month 
or 4.1% annually, in the following year.  This amount is both statistically and 
economically significant. 
Table 2.9 presents the results for the sub-period of 1999 to 2006.  Although the 
difference in stock performance between low and high capital investments quintiles and 
the difference between low and high entrenchment groups are positive, these differences 
are not statistically significant anymore. 
In summary, it seems that the results from the main analyses are mainly driven by 
the sub-period of 1991 to 1999.  During this sub-period, entrenched firms that made 
abnormally high level of capital investments experienced poor stock performance 
subsequently. 
 
5.2 Sub-sample Excluding Equity Issuance 
The previous literature has documented evidence that there exists negative 
abnormal stock performance after firms issue equity.  It is important to show that the 
results on stock performance after capital investments in this essay are separate from the 
equity issues anomaly.  I do this by excluding firms that issue equities.  I identify equity 
issuers as firms with an amount of net equity issuance above a certain threshold.  Table 
2.10 excludes firms with net equity issuance above 10% of total assets, and Table 2.11 
excludes firms with net equity issuance above 5% of total assets.  Net equity issuance is 
defined as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings. 
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The findings in the main analyses are robust to the exclusion of equity issuance.  
Panel A and Panel B of Table 2.10 shows that excluding firms with net equity issues 
above 10% of total assets, firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments 
underperform those with a low level of abnormal capital investments by 0.329% per 
month or 3.9% annually, and high entrenchment firms underperform low entrenchment 
firms by 0.204% per month or 2.4% annually.  Panel C shows that the underperformance 
of firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments exists only among high 
entrenchment firms; the magnitude of this underperformance is 0.502% per month or 
6.0% annually.  On the other hand, the underperformance of high entrenchment firms 
exists only among firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments; the magnitude 
of this underperformance is 0.378% per month or 4.5% annually. 
Table 2.11 presents the findings using a sub-sample that excludes firms with net 
equity issuance above 5% of total assets.  The results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar to the findings in Table 2.10.  Panel A and Panel B shows that excluding firms 
with net equity issues above 5% of total assets, firms with a high level of abnormal 
capital investments underperform those with a low level of abnormal capital investments 
by 0.317% per month or 3.8% annually, and high entrenchment firms underperform low 
entrenchment firms by 0.165% per month or 2.0% annually.  Panel C shows that the 
underperformance of firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments exists only 
among high entrenchment firms; the magnitude of this underperformance is 0.504% per 
month or 6.0% annually.  On the other hand, the underperformance of high entrenchment 
firms exists only among firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments; the 
magnitude of this underperformance is 0.370% per month or 4.4% annually. 
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In summary, the findings in the main analyses are robust to the exclusion of 
equity issuance.  In other words, the findings in the main analyses are not driven by the 
equity issues anomaly. 
 
5.3 Governance Index as of the Beginning of the Sample Period 
It is important to address potential endogeneity problems in any research on 
corporate governance.  This essay addresses potential endogeneity problems in several 
different ways.  First of all, this essay examines the interaction between governance and 
capital investments, while controlling for governance itself.  If an endogenous relation 
between corporate governance and firm performance exists, it is more likely to be 
revealed through the governance term rather than the interaction term.  This is especially 
true because the level of capital investments varies significantly more than corporate 
governance structure over time. 
One form of endogeneity is omitted variables.  While it is impossible to list all 
potential omitted variables, one that many would consider is managerial ability.  It is 
possible that managers with inferior abilities display poor performance, and at the same 
time, such managers tend to favor the adoption of takeover provisions and spend huge 
amount of money in investments.  This endogeneity problem can be alleviated by 
controlling for past performance in the measurement of abnormal performance, if 
managerial abilities are partly reflect in past performance.  As discussed previously, both 
the abnormal stock performance and the abnormal earnings announcement returns in this 
essay are measured against benchmark firms with similar prior performance, among other 
firm characteristics.  Such construction of abnormal performance alleviates the 
endogeneity problem caused by omitted variable of managerial abilities. 
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A second form of endogeneity is reversed causality.  It could be the case that in 
expectation of poor performance, mangers adopt takeover provisions to entrench 
themselves.  As stated above, the interaction with capital investments makes this 
argument harder to make.  Nevertheless, in this sub-section, I perform the analyses of 
stock performance using the governance data in the first year the data become available 
(governance data as of 1990) instead of the slowly changing contemporaneous 
governance data.11  Results are robust to this alternative measure of corporate 
governance. 
Table 2.12 shows that using Entrenchment Index as of 1990, the findings from 
Table 2.2 hold.  Firm with higher level of entrenchment, measured by the value of 
Entrenchment Index as of 1990, are more likely to invest more, after controlling for other 
firm characteristics. The coefficients of the Entrenchment Index for both regressions of 
capital investments and abnormal capital investments are significantly positive. 
Table 2.13 examines how stock performance is associated with capital 
investments and level of entrenchment, where entrenchment is measured by the value of 
the Entrenchment Index as of 1990.  Panel B shows that high entrenchment firms do not 
significantly underperform low entrenchment firms for the overall sample.  This is not 
surprising given that the governance measure is stale rather than contemporary. 
What is more interesting for the purpose of this essay is whether the evidence of 
the interaction of entrenchment and capital investments holds using this alternative 
governance measure that is less subject to endogeneity.  Panel C of Table 2.13 shows that 
even with the stale entrenchment measure, results in Table 2.4 hold.  Firms with a high 
level of abnormal capital investments underperform those with a low level of abnormal 
capital investments only among entrenched firms.  The magnitude of this 
                                                 
11 This technique was employed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
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underperformance for high entrenchment firms is 0.470% per month or 5.6% annually, in 
the following year.  This amount is both statistically and economically significant.  On 
the other hand, the underperformance of high entrenchment firms exists only among 
firms with high level of abnormal capital investments.  The magnitude of this 
underperformance of firms with high abnormal capital investments is 0.302% per month 
or 3.6% annually, in the following year.  This amount is both statistically and 
economically significant. 
In summary, the findings suggest that entrenched firms with a high level of 
abnormal capital investments are more likely to experience poor stock performance 
subsequently.  Such findings are robust to the alternative measure governance, the 
Entrenchment Index as of 1990.  The evidence suggests that the findings in this essay are 
not likely to be driven by endogeneity. 
 
5.4 Alternative Measures of Capital Investments 
In this sub-section, I examine whether the findings on stock performance is robust 
to alternative measures of capital investments. 
 
5.4.1 Industry Adjusted Abnormal Capital Investments 
The first alternative measure of abnormal capital investment is industry adjusted 
level of capital investments.  The expected level of capital investments of a firm in a year 
is calculated as the median of capital investments of firms in the same Fama and French 
(1997) forty-eight industry in that given year.  The abnormal capital investment is 
calculated as the difference between the actual and expected level of capital investments. 
Table 2.14 presents the findings.  Panel A shows that the underperformance of 
firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments is positive but insignificant for 
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the overall sample.  What is more interesting for the purpose of this essay is whether the 
evidence of the interaction of entrenchment and abnormal capital investments holds using 
this alternative measure of abnormal capital investments.  Panel C of Table 2.13 shows 
evidence that is consistent with results presented in Table 2.4.  Firms with a high level of 
abnormal capital investments underperform those with a low level of abnormal capital 
investments among entrenched firms.  The magnitude of this underperformance for high 
entrenchment firms is 0.275% per month or 3.3% annually, in the following year.  
However, this amount is not statistically significant.  On the other hand, the 
underperformance of high entrenchment firms exists only among firms with a high level 
of abnormal capital investments.  The magnitude of this underperformance of firms with 
a high level of abnormal capital investments is 0.542% per month or 6.5% annually, in 
the following year.  This amount is both statistically and economically significant. 
In summary, results of the analyses of stock performance using industry adjusted 
capital investments are consistent with the findings in the main analyses. 
 
5.4.2 Characteristics Adjusted Abnormal Capital Investments 
The second alternative measure of abnormal capital investments takes into 
consideration differences in firm characteristics.  I run a clustered panel regression of 
capital investments on lagged market to book ratio, lagged book leverage, lagged cash, 
firm age, lagged firm size, prior stock run up, and lagged capital investments.  I take the 
residual as the amount of abnormal capital investments of the firm, and form the 
Abnormal Capital Investments quintiles based on this measure. 
Table 2.15 presents the findings.  Panel A shows that the underperformance of 
firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments is positive but insignificant for 
the overall sample.  What is more interesting for the purpose of this essay is whether the 
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evidence of the interaction of entrenchment and abnormal capital investments holds using 
this alternative measure of abnormal capital investments.  Panel C of Table 2.14 shows 
evidence that is consistent with results presented in Table 2.4.  Firms with a high level of 
abnormal capital investments underperform those with a low level of abnormal capital 
investments only among entrenched firms.  The magnitude of this underperformance for 
high entrenchment firms is 0.239% per month or 2.9% annually, in the following year.  
However, this amount is not statistically significant.  On the other hand, the 
underperformance of high entrenchment firms exists only among firms with a high level 
of abnormal capital investments.  The magnitude of this underperformance of firms with 
high abnormal capital investments is 0.344% per month or 4.1% annually, in the 
following year.  This amount is both statistically and economically significant. 
In summary, results of the analyses of stock performance using firm 
characteristics adjusted capital investments are consistent with the findings in the main 
analyses. 
 
5.4.3 Capital Expenditures and Mergers & Acquisitions 
The measure of capital investments in the main analyses includes only capital 
expenditures.  In this sub-section, I use a broader measure of capital investments, which 
includes both capital expenditures and acquisitions.  Findings in the main analyses are 
robust to this alternative measure of capital investments. 
Table 2.16 presents the findings.  Panel A shows that the underperformance of 
firms with a high level of abnormal capital investments is positive but insignificant for 
the overall sample.  What is more interesting for the purpose of this essay is whether the 
evidence of the interaction of entrenchment and abnormal capital investments holds using 
this alternative measure of abnormal capital investments.  Panel C of Table 2.16 shows 
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evidence that is consistent with results presented in Table 2.4.  Firms with a high level of 
abnormal capital investments underperform those with a low level of abnormal capital 
investments only among entrenched firms.  The magnitude of this underperformance for 
high entrenchment firms is 0.323% per month or 3.9% annually, in the following year.  
This amount is both statistically and economically significant.  On the other hand, the 
underperformance of high entrenchment firms exists only among firms with high level of 
abnormal capital investments.  The magnitude of this underperformance of firms with 
high abnormal capital investments is 0.498% per month or 5.9% annually, in the 
following year.  This amount is both statistically and economically significant. 
In summary, the findings in the main analyses are robust to the measure of 
abnormal capital investments that incorporates both capital expenditures and acquisitions 
as capital investments. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This essay studies whether corporate governance impacts firm value through 
capital investments.  I find that among firms with weak corporate governance, those with 
high abnormal capital investments significantly underperform those with low abnormal 
capital investments.  The difference in abnormal stock performance is 4.2% in the year 
following the capital investments, which is both statistically and economically 
significant.  In addition, a significant portion of the difference in stock performance 
between these two subgroups occurs around earnings announcements.  In contrast, the 
level of abnormal capital investments is not related to subsequent stock performance or 
earnings announcement returns for firms with strong corporate governance. 
On the other hand, among firms with a high level of abnormal capital 
investments, firms with weak corporate governance underperform firms with strong 
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corporate governance.  The difference in abnormal stock performance is 3.1% in the year 
following the capital investments, which is both statistically and economically 
significant.  In addition, a significant portion of the difference in stock performance 
between these two subgroups occurs around earnings announcements.  In contrast, 
strength of corporate governance is not related to subsequent stock performance or 
earnings announcement returns for firms with a low level of abnormal capital 
investments. 
These findings provide evidence for the role of corporate governance structure in 
mitigating the overinvestment tendency of mangers and hence increasing firm value.  
Furthermore, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the stock market under-
reacts to the agency problem of weakly governed firms. 
This essay establishes evidence for one specific channel through which corporate 
governance structure increase firm value – capital investment decisions.  Strong corporate 
governance mitigates the overinvestment problem and hence enhances firm performance.  
In addition, this essay provides potential explanation for the capital investment anomaly.  
It supports the hypothesis that the market under-reacts to overinvestment of weakly 
governed firms. 
The essay has the following implications.  First, investors in the stock market 
should be cautious about high investments made by weakly governed firms.  On average 
investors would benefit from selling or not holding stocks of such firms.  Second, 
corporations should make efforts to reduce the level of managerial entrenchment and 
strengthen the corporate governance structures.  The benefit of a stronger corporate 
governance structure would come from two sources: from forcing the management to 
make better investment decisions, as well as from sending a good signal about the quality 
of the capital investments to the investors in the stock market. 
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Chapter 3:  Insider Trading and Investment, Operating, and Financing 
Decisions of SEO Firms 
1.  MOTIVATION 
This essay examines how pre-issue insider trading is related to subsequent 
investment, operating, and financing decisions of SEO firms for evidence on the decision 
to issue equity. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) provide a theoretical model for the firm’s decision to 
issue additional equity that suggests that firms do not only issue equity to fund growth 
opportunities.  Rather, their model suggests that asymmetric information between insiders 
and outside investors can result in a pooling equilibrium in which both firms with good 
growth opportunities and those without good growth opportunities may issue equity.  The 
latter may issue equity when managers believe their firms’ shares are over-valued.12 
It is not easy to differentiate between issuers with over-priced shares and those 
with good growth opportunities because insiders’ perceptions of their firms’ valuations 
and timing opportunities are not directly observable.  However, it is plausible that insider 
trading, which is observable, could reflect information about insiders’ perceptions of firm 
value. 
The literature on insider trading and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) provides 
evidence that insiders sell more heavily around SEOs.  However, there exists mixed 
evidence on whether insider trading predicts the long run performance of SEO firms.  
While Lee (1997) and Lee (2002) find that insider trading is not related to long run stock 
                                                 
12 Many empirical studies report evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that firms conduct SEOs 
when insiders believe that their shares are over-valued.  For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997),  
and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that, on average, issuers of seasoned equity subsequently 
underperform their benchmarks in the long run.  In a survey of practitioners, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
find that 67 percent of the CEOs identify the magnitude of equity over-valuation or under-valuation as 
either an important or a very important factor in making common equity issuance decisions. 
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performance of primary seasoned equity issuers, Kahle (2000) and Clarke, Dunbar, and 
Kahle (2000) find that stock returns of industrial SEO issuers with abnormally high 
insider selling are lower than those of benchmark firms.  Given the difficulty in 
constructing a convincing measure of abnormal long run stock performance, research on 
other aspects of the issuer, in addition to stock performance, is needed to understand 
whether insiders knowingly time the equity market. 
This study examines how insider trading activity prior to SEOs is related to 
subsequent investment, operating, and financing decisions of the issuers.  I find that SEO 
firms with more abnormal insider sales issue more seasoned equity.  Such firms do not 
make more investments; rather, they hold the extra proceeds in cash balance and increase 
dividend payouts more.  There also exists weak evidence that such firms tend to have 
worse operating performance and they issue less equity subsequently to reverse the 
effects of equity issuance on their capital structures. 
These findings suggest that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales are more 
likely to have overpriced stock, while those with less abnormal insider sales are more 
likely to have good investment opportunities.  Insiders have superior information about 
the firm value and they use this information to time both personal trades and public 
equity offerings.  Insider trading activity prior to SEOs provides valuable information 
about the firms’ incentives to issue seasoned equities.  In addition, insider information 
about the issuer’s valuation not only influences the firm’s decision to issue seasoned 
equity, but also has an impact on the firms’ real activities following the SEO.  Pre-issue 
Insider trading activity helps predict subsequent investment, operating, and financing 
decisions of the issuer. 
This essay contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, the analysis of real 
activities following SEOs provides evidence that insiders knowingly time the equity 
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market.  This evidence adds to that from previous studies of insider trading and SEO 
performance, which mainly focus on the stock performance and yield mixed results. 
Second, while many studies examine how insider trading activity is related to the 
equity issuance decision, none examines whether misvaluation of the issuer’s stock is 
related to its subsequent investment, operating, and financing decisions.  This study is the 
first to document that insiders’ perceptions of firm values, reflected in their pre-issue 
personal trading, not only influence manager’s decisions to issue equity, but also affect 
the real activities of the firms following the SEO. 
Third, this study finds evidence that the market timing attempts of SEO issuers 
have only temporary effects on the firms’ capital structures.  There is an ongoing debate 
on whether the effect of market timing efforts on capital structures is persistent or 
temporary.  On one hand, Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Huang and Ritter (2007) find 
that historical market timing measures have persistent effects on firms’ capital structures; 
on the other hand, Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Alti (2006) use alternative measures of 
market timing opportunities and find that the timing effects on leverage quickly reverse 
for market timers. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
motivation for using insider trading as a measure to differentiate market timers and 
growth firms.  Section 3 lists testable hypotheses and Section 4 describes the data and 
variables used in the analysis.  Section 5 presents the empirical tests and findings.  
Section 6 describes robustness checks.  Finally, Section 7 concludes the essay. 
 
2.  MARKET TIMING AND INSIDER TRADING 
It is difficult to differentiate between firms that are simply timing the market and 
firms that are funding growth opportunities.  One reason is that it is not possible to 
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directly observe insiders’ valuation of their firms and their perception of market timing 
opportunities.  Several proxies for equity mis-valuation and timing opportunities are used 
in the literature.  Some studies use aggregate market timing measures.  For example, Alti 
(2006) finds evidence that firms that complete an IPO in a hot equity market are more 
likely to be market timers, while firms go public in cold equity markets are more likely to 
be growth firms.  While such a classification scheme measures market-wide timing 
opportunities, it is not designed to capture the difference in market timing opportunities 
among individual firms, which calls for a firm-specific market timing measure. 
One commonly used firm-specific measure of market timing opportunity is the 
market-to-book ratio.  The rationale for using this measure is that a firm is more likely to 
be overvalued if the market perceives its value to be much higher than its book value.  
However, a firm’s market-to-book ratio is a very noisy proxy for mis-valuation.  This 
ratio could be high when the firm has good growth opportunities and the market 
incorporates this information in its valuation.  In addition, even if the market-to-book 
ratio captures market’s perception of misevaluation, market perception could deviate 
from the perception of insiders, who make the decision of issuing equity.  Therefore, the 
market-to-book ratio is not a good measure with which to distinguish between market 
timers and growth firms. 
An alternative measure of firm-specific market timing opportunities is estimated 
using valuation models.  Jindra (2000), among others, estimates the mis-valuation of 
shares of SEO issuers by computing the difference between the actual market value and 
the estimated fair value of those shares.  Given that the fair value is estimated using 
accounting variables, the validity and accuracy of the market timing measure is highly 
dependent on the specification of the model.  In addition, as with the market-to-book 
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ratio, this misevaluation measure is based on public information instead of inside 
information. 
Ex-post firm performance might also be used to identify shares that are 
misvalued.  For example, Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) use the actual long-term abnormal 
returns following SEOs as a proxy for insiders’ perceptions of a firm’s value.  A problem 
with this measure, as noted by the authors, is that the cross-sectional standard deviation 
of post-issue performance and, hence, the standard errors are extremely large.  As a 
result, the empirical tests lack of explanatory power. 
This essay develops a measure of market timing opportunities based on insider 
trading.  While how insiders value their firm’s market timing opportunities and share 
values is not directly observable, trading activities of insiders are.  We should expect that 
insider trading activity reflects the information that insiders have about the current 
condition and future prospects of their firm.  For this reason, this study uses insider 
trading to differentiate between market timers and growth firms among SEO issuers. 
The idea that insiders have superior information is well known and is well 
summarized in the following excerpt from discussion on insider trading activity from the 
February 1998 issue of Individual investor: 
“Company executives and directors know their business more intimately than any 
Wall Street analyst ever would.  They know when a new product is flying out the door, 
when inventories are piling up, whether profit margins are expanding or whether 
production costs are rising… you always hear about the smart money.  Generally, that is 
the smart money.” 
If insiders have private information about the future prospects and value of their 
firm, and adjust their own holdings accordingly, then we expect to see that insiders are 
more likely to sell their shares prior to an SEO if they believe the stock is overvalued, and 
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are more likely to maintain or increase their shareholdings when they believe the issuing 
firm has good growth opportunities. 
Many studies have examined the relation between SEOs and insider trading 
activity.  These studies generally focus on either the relation between insider trading 
activity and the decision to issue equity, or the relation between the insider trading 
activity and stock performance around SEOs. 
The first group of studies documents the existence of abnormal insider trading 
activity around SEOs.  Karpoff and Lee (1991) find significant insider selling prior to the 
announcement of common stock issues.  Gombola, Lee, and Liu (1999) find that the 
significant insider selling prior to the offering announcement continues after the 
announcement is made public.  Jenter (2004) finds that managers try to actively time the 
market both in their private trades and in corporate financing decisions.  These findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that insider information affects to both insider trading 
and equity offerings. 
The second group of studies examines whether insider trading around SEOs is 
related to issuers’ stock performance.  These studies provide mixed evidence. 
Studies on short-term stock performance provide mixed evidence.  Lee (1997) and 
Gombola, Lee, and Liu (1999) find insignificant relation between insider trading and the 
SEO announcement returns.  In contrast, Kahle (2000) finds that SEO announcement 
returns are significantly negatively related to insider selling. 
Studies on long-term stock performance also provide mixed results.  Lee (1997) 
and Lee (2002) find no significant relation between trading by top executive and the 
long-run stock performance of primary SEO firms that sell new shares.  On the other 
hand, Kahle (2000) and Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2001) find that industrial SEO 
issuers with abnormally high insider selling underperform their benchmark firms in the 
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long run, whereas SEO firms with abnormally high insider buying do not.  The mixed 
evidence is not very surprising, given that the analysis of long run performance following 
SEOs is very sensitive to the choice of the benchmark for expected stock returns and the 
way in which long run abnormal stock returns are computed. 
Because of this lack of clarity for abnormal stock return studies, this study looks 
to the real activities of firms following SEOs for evidence on whether firms time these 
offerings to take advantage of over-priced shares.  The analysis of real activities offers 
many insights on equity market timing that the study of stock returns cannot provide. 
One implication of market timing is that market timers issue more equity than 
they need.  Therefore, analysis of usage of proceeds helps us to understand whether firms 
time the equity markets.  It is more straightforward to analyze how the issuers use the 
proceeds from SEOs than to estimate abnormal long run stock performance following 
SEOs.  Second, insiders may have better information about their firms’ future operating 
performance than about future stock returns.  Evidence from operating performance 
provides additional evidence of insiders’ timing abilities.  Finally, if the trade-off theory 
of capital structure holds, market timers deviate from their target capital structure by 
issuing equity and they will undo the effects of market timing following SEOs.  The 
analysis of post-issue financing decisions sheds light on the validity of this prediction. 
 
3.  HYPOTHESES 
This study tests several hypotheses of how insider trading would be associated 
with the real activities of SEO firms, which I describe in this sub-section. 
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3.1. Amount of Equity Issues and Usage of Proceeds 
The idea that managers time the equity markets has several implications.  First, 
firms are more likely to issue equity when insiders perceive their firms to be undervalued.  
Second, controlling for other firm characteristics, market timers issue more equity.  In 
addition, to the extent that market timers raise more equity capital than they need, they 
are more likely to hold more of the proceeds in the form of cash or distribute more cash 
as dividends, rather than using the proceeds to increase the level of their investment 
activity.13  Cheng (1995) finds that the long run underperformance is most severe for 
equity issuers that do not invest the proceeds in capital projects.  Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) find that firms tend to keep a faction of the money raised in equity offer in cash 
balance, and this fraction is substantially higher for firms with higher market valuations.  
Using aggregate IPO volume as a proxy for market timing opportunities, Alti (2006) 
finds evidence consistent with the above prediction about the amount of equity issues, 
investment, cash holding, and dividend payout of market timers. 
Using insider trading as a proxy for market timing opportunities, this study tests 
the following hypotheses regarding the amount of equity issues and the usage of proceeds 
from the SEO: (1) SEO firms with more abnormal high pre-issue insider sales raise more 
capital in the SEO; (2) such issuers increase their cash balances and/or payouts following 
the SEO; and (3) they do not make more capital investments. 
 
3.2. Operating Performance Following SEOs 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document that on average post-issue operating 
performance of SEO firms deteriorates.  Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find that insider 
                                                 
13 With the existence of agency problem, it is plausible that market timers are more likely to invest in 
negative NPV projects, since insiders of these firms have sold more of their own shares and have less 
incentive to maximize firm value.  However, empirical study of Richardson (2006) finds no relation 
between insider shares and estimated amount of over-investment. 
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purchases are positively related to firms’ future earnings performance.  However, no 
study has examined whether insider trading around SEOs is related to post-issue earnings 
performance. 
Using insider trading as a proxy for market timing opportunities, this study tests 
the following hypotheses:  SEO firms with more abnormal high pre-issue insider sales are 
more likely to exhibit worse long-term operating performance subsequent to the SEO. 
 
3.3. Capital Structure Following SEOs 
Several studies examine how market timing attempts are associated with 
subsequent capital structure decisions, and specifically, whether the effects of market 
timing on capital structure persist or reverse subsequently.14  These studies provide mixed 
evidence.  Baker and Wurgler (2002) construct a historical market timing measure using 
the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the timing opportunity perceived by managers.  
They find that firms’ leverage ratios are strongly related to historical market timing 
measures and that the effects persist beyond ten years.  Huang and Ritter (2007) find that 
historical values of the cost of equity have persistent effects on firms’ capital structures.  
In contrast, Kayhan and Titman (2007) propose an alternative market timing measure 
based on the market-to-book ratio, and find that capital structure changes are not 
persistent.  Alti (2006) identifies market timers as firms that go public in a hot IPO 
market, and finds that timing effects on leverage quickly reverse for such firms.   
If firms target at a specific level or a range of leverage ratios, and market timers 
deviate from the target because their market valuation is temporarily high, then SEO 
firms with more abnormal insider sales would be expected to subsequently undo the 
                                                 
14 The research question regarding persistence of market timing effects on capital structure is important 
because persistence would imply that the traditional determinants of capital structure studied in the 
literature would have limited roles in explaining firm financial policies. 
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market timing effects on capital structures.15  In other words, such firms would be more 
likely to increase their leverage in the years following the SEO.  In contrast, SEO firms 
with less abnormal high insider purchases are more likely to be firms that have recently 
obtained new growth opportunities, and hence, require a lower target leverage to maintain 
financial flexibility, which is predicted by traditional trade-off theory of capital structure.  
Such firms would be less likely to reverse the effects of the SEO on their capital 
structures. 
 
4.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
4.1. SEO Data 
The original sample consists of SEOs conducted during the period of 1986 to 
2003, recorded by the Securities Data Company (SDC).16 Following the previous studies 
on SEOs, I exclude the following firms from the original SEO sample: (1) rights issues; 
(2) unit issues; (3) spin-offs and (4) shelf registrations; (5) SEOs within a year from last 
equity issuance. 
 
4.2. Accounting and Financial Data 
Accounting and financial data are obtained from Compustat Industrial Annual 
dataset on WRDS.  I exclude the following firms from the original SEO sample: (1) firms 
with no data on Compustat Industrial Annual dataset; (2) financial firms with SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999; and (3) utility firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999. 
                                                 
15 Graham and Harvey (2001)’s survey reports that 37% of the survey respondents have a flexible target, 
34% have a somewhat tight target or range and 10% have a strict target. 
16 The sample starts in 1986, the earliest year for which the Thompson Financial Insiders dataset is 
available. 
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Variables are defined as follows.17  Book debt (BD) is defined as total liabilities 
(COMPUSTAT Annual data181) and preferred stock (Data10) minus deferred taxes 
(Data35) and convertible debt (Data79).  Book equity (BE) is total assets (Data6) minus 
book debt.  Book leverage (BL) is defined as book debt divided by total assets. Firm-year 
observations where book leverage exceeds 100% are dropped.  Amount of net debt issues 
is the change in book debt divided by total assets.  Amount of net equity issues is the 
change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings (Data36), divided by total 
assets.  INV is capital expenditures (Data128) divided by total assets. DIV is common 
dividends (Data21) divided by book equity. CASH is cash and short-term investments 
(Data1) divided by total assets.  ∆CASH is the change in data1 divided by total assets.  
Newly retained earnings (newlyRE) is the change in retained earnings divided by total 
assets. 
Market-to-book ratio (MtoB) is book debt plus market equity (common shares 
outstanding (Item 25) times share price (Data199)) divided by total assets.  As in Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), I drop observations where the market-to-book ratio exceeds 10.0.  
Profitability is measured by EBITDA, which is earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation (Data13) divided by assets. SIZE is the logarithm of net sales (Data12). 
Asset tangibility (PPE) is defined as net plant, property, and equipment (Data8) divided 
by assets. R&D is research and development expense (Data46) divided by net sales 
(data12).18  These variables have been shown in the literature to have significant impacts 
on firms’ capital structures and financing decisions.19 
                                                 
17 The definitions of the variables are consistent with the capital structure literature, such as Baker and 
Wurgler (2002).  See Kayhan and Titman (2007) Table 1 for a detailed reference of the literature using 
these definitions. 
18 In the regressions I also control for RDD, a dummy variable that equals one if R&D data is missing. 
19 See Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001). 
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Other control variables in the regression analysis are as follows.  Prior stock 
return is the twelve month cumulative stock returns prior to the SEO.  Days since IPO is 
the number of days since the IPO date.  Primary Shares % is the percentage of primary 
shares in the equity offering.  SEO firms with different levels of insider sales could differ 
in prior stock returns, firm age, and percentage of primary shares.  Therefore, it is 
important to control for these characteristics in analyzing the real activities of SEO firms. 
Finally, to control for differences in investment, operating, and financing 
decisions across industries, I include industry dummies based on the 48-industry 
categorization in Fama and French (1997) in all regressions.  In addition, to control for 
differences in firms’ investment, operating, and financing decisions across time, I include 
year dummies in all regressions. 
 
4.3. Insider Trading Data 
Data on insider trades of SEO firms are obtained from the Thomson Financial 
Insiders dataset on WRDS.  For each SEO firm, I summarize the open market stock 
purchases and sales of top executives and directors transacted during the six-month 
period ending on the issue date of the SEO.20  Following the previous literature on insider 
trading, I exclude transactions involving less than 100 shares.21 
There are several alternatives in constructing the measure of insider trading 
activity.  The first alternative measure is the level of insider trading prior to the SEO.  
While this is a most straightforward measure of insider trading, SEO firms with different 
level of insider trading activity may be fundamentally different, and hence, hard to 
                                                 
20 I include only open market insider trades reported to the SEC and classified under the “directors” and 
“officers” categories in the Thomson Financial Insider data.  Previous research has shown that trades by 
principal shareholders who are not officers or directors do not convey much information.  See Seyhun 
(1986) and Kahle (2000). 
21 See Lee (1997) and Kahle (2000), among others. 
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compare.  Alternatively, abnormal level of insider trading activity can be constructed, 
controlling for either historical level of insider trading or firm characteristics and firm 
fixed effects.  Therefore, the second alternative measure of insider trading is the 
abnormal level of pre-SEO insider trading above historical level, and the third alternative 
is the abnormal level of pre-SEO insider trading controlling for firm characteristics and 
fixed effects. 
In the main analyses, I employ the second alternative of insider trading, abnormal 
insider trading above historical level, which is a simple measure that takes into 
consideration the potential heteroskadasticity in insider trading activity across firms.  
Specifically, I define a variable called Abnormal Sales Percentage, which equals the 
difference between the percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO and 
the expected percentage of insider sales based on historical level.  Percentage of insider 
sales is calculated as one plus total number of insider sales divided by two plus sum of 
total number of insider sales and insider purchases during the same period.  The expected 
percentage of insider sales is calculated as percentage of insider sales in the year starting 
at two year prior to the SEO.22  As discussed above, the advantage of this simple measure 
of abnormal insider sales is that it takes into account the heteroskadasticity of insider 
trading activities across firms. 
In the section of robustness checks, I perform the analyses using the other two 
alternative measures of insider trading.  Key findings are robust to these alternative 
measures of inside trading.  In addition, I examine insider trading reported in the six 
months prior to the SEO, rather than insider trading transacted in the six months prior to 
                                                 
22 This is similar in spirit to how Kahle (2000) defines abnormally high insider trading.  However, I use a 
shorter period (one year instead of four years in Kahle (2000)) to calculate the expected insider trading 
because firm characteristics could have changed dramatically in four years.  In addition, my definition with 
a shorter period to measure the expected level of insider trades offers a much larger sample. 
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the SEO.  The finings using this alternative insider trading measure is also presented in 
the section of robustness tests. 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL TESTS AND FINDINGS 
 
5.1. Insider Trading Prior to SEOs 
To study whether insider trading is related to equity market timing, the first step is 
to examine whether insider trading activity changes substantially prior to SEOs. As 
discussed previously, several empirical studies provide evidence on abnormally high 
insider selling prior to SEOs.23  I examine whether this result holds in the sample 
examined in this study. 
Table 3.1 shows the patterns of insider trading prior to SEOs.  Panel A of Table 
3.1 reports the mean and standard deviation of numbers of insider sales and insider 
purchases.  Consistent with findings from the previous literature on insider trading and 
SEOs, insiders tend to sell more and purchase less prior to SEOs.  The average number of 
insider sales in six months increases from 3.2 in the three years ending at one year prior 
to the SEO to 7.4 in the six months prior to SEOs.  The average number of insider 
purchases decreases from 2.1 to 1.2 correspondingly.  Panel B of Table 3.1 shows that the 
change in number of insider sales and the change in number of insider purchases in the 
six months prior to SEOs are both economically and statistically significant.  The 
dramatic change in insider trading activity prior to SEOs suggests that such activity is 
related to the issuance of the seasoned equity. 
It is also important to note that there is substantial variation in insider trading 
activity among issuers in the six months prior to SEOs.  The standard deviation of the 
                                                 
23 See Karpoff and Lee (1991) and Gombola, Lee, and Liu (1999). 
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number of insider sales is 19.4, and the standard deviation of the number of insider 
purchases is 3.2.  These variations are consistent with that insiders’ perception of their 
firm’ value varies prior to the SEO and that insider trading activity in this period could 
convey information on such perception. 
The change and variation in insider trading activity in the six months prior to 
SEOs confirm the validity of employing a measure of abnormal insider trading based on 
trades during this period as a proxy for inside information regarding firm values and 
market timing opportunities.  As discussed previously, I define Abnormal Sales 
Percentage as the percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO minus the 
historical percentage of insider sales in the year starting at two year prior to the SEO.  I 
examine how this Abnormal Sales Percentage is related to the investment, operating, and 
financing decisions of issuers following SEOs. 
In the analyses of insider trading and a firm’s investment, operating, and 
financing decisions, it is important to control for other firm characteristics for several 
reasons.  First, firm characteristics at the time of the SEO can be associated with firm’s 
market timing opportunities.  As discussed previously, the market-to-book ratio prior to 
the SEO can be associated with its market timing opportunities.  Similarly, prior stock 
returns and percentage of primary shares offered in an SEO can also be associated with a 
firm’s market timing opportunities.  In addition, as discussed previously, whether an SEO 
is completed in a hot equity market can be associated with market-wide timing 
opportunities. 
Second, several firm characteristics can be related to insider trading incentives not 
associated with insiders’ valuation of the firm.  Time since IPO can proxy for a firms’ 
stage in life cycle and hence be associated with insiders’ incentive to diversity their 
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portfolio.  Prior stock returns can also be associated with insiders’ incentive to sell shares 
to diversify their portfolio. 
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents the correlations between Abnormal Sales 
Percentage and the above firm- or issue- specific characteristics at the time of the SEO.  
The correlations table shows that firms with higher abnormal sales percentage are 
associated with higher market to book, higher prior stock returns, longer period since 
IPO, lower percentage of primary shares in the SEO, and lower book leverage.  Such 
firms are also less likely to be completing the SEO in a hot equity market.   
Finally, firm characteristics such as market-to-book ratio, EBITD, size, and R&D 
may have an impact on its investment, operating, and financing decisions.  Panel B of 
Table 3.2 presents the correlations between Abnormal Sales Percentage and these control 
variables in the multiple regressions in my analyses.  Given the low correlations among 
the key variable, Abnormal Sales Percentage, and the above control variables, there exists 
no indication of potential multicolinearity problem. 
To control for the effects of the above variables in the analyses of how firms’ pre-
issue insider trading is associated with their investment, operating, and financing 
decisions subsequently, I include these variables in the multivariate regressions.  
Furthermore, to control for differences in financing and other corporate decisions across 
time and across industries, I include year dummies as well as industry dummies based on 
the forty-eight industries categorization in Fama and French (1997) in the regressions.24 
 
5.2. Financing Decisions in the Year of the SEO 
As discussed previously, an important implication of equity market timing is that 
market timers issue more equity than they need.  In this sub-section, I examine whether 
                                                 
24 Coefficient estimates for the year dummies and industry dummies are subsided from the tables. 
 49 
the amount of equity issues and the amount of debt issues in the year of the SEO are 
related to insider trading prior to SEOs, controlling for other firm characteristics. 
The regression of net equity issues is reported in the first row in Table 3.3.  
Controlling for other firm characteristics associated with amount of external financing 
needs, SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales issue significantly more equity.  This 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that such firms are more likely to be market 
timers. 
Consistent with findings from the previous literature, the regression of net equity 
issues shows that the pre-issue market-to-book ratio is positively associated with the 
amount of equity issue in the SEO.  As discussed previously, the evidence could be 
consistent with that the market-to-book ratio proxies for market timing opportunities or 
that this ratio is related to growth opportunities.  Nevertheless, given that the market-to-
book ratio is one of the control variables in the regression, the association between pre-
issue insider trading and amount of equity issuance is not driven by effects associated 
with the market-to-book ratio. 
The regression of net equity issues also shows that the pre-issue stock price run-
up is positively associated with the amount of equity issue in the SEO.  As discussed 
previously, pre-issue stock returns could be associated with a firm’s growth 
opportunities, market timing opportunities, or insiders’ needs to diversity their portfolios.  
Given that pre-issue stock price run-up is controlled for in the regression, the association 
between pre-issue insider trading and amount of equity issuance is not driven by the 
effects associated with pre-issue stock returns. 
In addition to net equity issues, I also examine the net debt issues in the year of 
the SEO.  Results are reported in the second row in Table 3.3.  The evidence suggests that 
SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales issue a lower amount of debt in the year of 
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the SEO.  This finding is not surprising because insider trading of stock shares should be 
more related to insiders’ perception of equity values rather than that of debt values.  
Given insiders’ belief of good equity market timing opportunities, they may engage more 
in the equity market and less in the debt market.  In contrast, interestingly, the coefficient 
on pre-issue market-to-book ratio in the regression of net debt issues is significantly 
positive, which suggests that firms with a high market-to-book ratio not only issue more 
equity but also issue more debt.  This finding is consistent with that higher market-to-
book ratio is associated with better growth opportunities and a greater need of all types of 
external financing. 
 
5.3. Usage of proceeds from the SEO 
There could be several alternative explanations why SEO firms with more 
abnormal insider sales issue more equity.  One explanation is that, as hypothesized in this 
essay, SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales are more likely to be market timers 
and they issue more equity than they need to take advantage of over-valued shares.  An 
alternative explanation is that such issuers are more likely to be growth firms that require 
more external equity financing.  Another alternative explanation is that on average such 
issuers are more likely to be over-levered prior to the SEO and they issue more equity to 
revert to their target capital structures.  This sub-section examines the first alternative 
explanation, and sub-section 5.5 provides tests to address the second alternative 
explanation. 
To understand whether SEO firms with more abnormal inside sales issue more 
equity to take advantage of the market timing opportunities or to fund good investment 
opportunities, it is important to examine the usage of proceeds from the SEO.  If the 
additional proceeds are used to make capital investments, then the evidence is consistent 
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with the growth opportunities hypothesis; if the additional proceeds are held as cash or 
paid out as dividends, then the evidence is consistent with the market timing hypothesis.  
To examine the relation between pre-issue insider trading and the usage of proceeds from 
the SEO, I run the regressions of change in cash balance, change in dividend, and the 
amount of investments on abnormal insider sales and control variables.  The results are 
presented in the last three rows in Table 3.3. 
The evidence suggests that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales hold 
more proceeds in cash in the year of the SEO.25  In addition, such SEO firms increase 
dividend payouts significantly more in the year of the SEO.  On the other hand, they are 
not significantly different from others in the amount of capital investments in the year of 
the SEO.  These findings suggest that SEO firms with abnormal insider sales do not issue 
more equity to fund investment projects or growth opportunities in the year of the SEO. 
Table 3.3 also shows how firms with different market-to-book ratio differ in 
change in cash balance, change in dividends, and the amount of investments in the year 
of the SEO.  While SEO firms with a higher market-to-book ratio put more proceeds in 
cash balance, such firms have significantly more reduction in dividend payouts and 
significantly higher amount of capital investments in the year of the SEO.  The findings 
on dividends and investments suggest that firms with a high market-to-book ratio are 
more likely to issue equity to fund good growth opportunity, rather than to take 
advantage of the equity market. 
One may argue that the finding that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales 
do not invest more in the SEO year does not necessarily indicate that they are less likely 
                                                 
25 A potential explanation for the evidence on the change in cash balance, alternative to the market timing 
hypothesis, is that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales are more likely to be firms that were short 
of cash and issued equity to increase their cash balances.  Unreported results do not support this alternative 
explanation.  First, the  correlation between abnormal insider sales and pre-SEO change in cash balance is 
positive 0.03; second, the coefficient of abnormal insider sales remains statistically significant after adding 
pre-SEO change in cash balance as a regressor, and the coefficient of pre-SEO change in cash balance is 
statistically insignificant. 
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to be growth firms, because it may take time for growth firms to make capital 
investments and they may hold the proceeds in cash for a while and make investments 
gradually.  To address this concern, I examine change in cash balance and the amount of 
investments in the three years following the SEO.  Results are presented in Table 3.4.  
The evidence suggest that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales do not reduce 
their cash balances or invest more heavily in the years following the SEO.  Therefore, the 
evidence is not consistent with the hypothesis that such SEO firms are growth firms that 
gradually use the proceeds from the SEO to make capital investments. 
Table 3.4 also shows how pre-issue market-to-book ratio is associated with the 
change in cash balance and the amount of capital investments in the years following the 
SEO.  The coefficients of the market-to-book ratio are significantly positive up to three 
years subsequent to the SEO.  In other words, SEO firms with a higher market-to-book 
ratio are more likely to use more proceeds to make capital investments.  In addition, there 
is evidence that such firms reduce their cash balance more in the second year following 
the SEO.  These findings are consistent with that SEO firms with a high market-to-book 
ratio are associated with good investment opportunities.  Such evidence indicates the 
problem of the previous studies that use the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for market 
timing, as discussed previously. 
In addition, Table 3.4 shows how pre-issue stock price run-up is associated with 
the change in cash balances and the amount of capital investments subsequent to the 
SEO.  Evidence suggests that firms with higher pre-issue stock returns significantly 
increase cash balances in the SEO year.  However, such firms significantly reduce cash 
balances in the third year following the SEO and make significantly more investments 
following the SEO.  Such evidence is consistent with that SEO firms with higher pre-
issue stock returns are more likely to be growth firms. 
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To summarize the findings on the association between insider trading and the 
usage of proceeds, SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales issue more equity in the 
SEO and subsequently, hold more cash, and increase dividend payouts more, and they do 
not invest more heavily.  These findings suggest that SEO firms with more abnormal 
insider sales are more likely to issue seasoned equity to time the equity market, rather 
than to fund growth opportunities. 
 
5.4. Operating Performance 
To examine how pre-issue insider trading is associated with post-SEO operating 
performance, I run regressions of EBITD in each of the five years subsequent to the SEO 
on abnormal insider sales and control variables.  Results are reported in Table 3.5. 
Controlling for other firm characteristics, I find evidence that SEO firms with 
more abnormal insider sales have worse operating performance in year three after the 
SEO.  This finding is consistent the hypothesis that SEO firms with more abnormal 
insider sales are more likely to be timing the market.  In addition, the fact that such firms 
do not perform better than others suggests that they do not issue more equity to fund good 
growth opportunities. 
Table 3.5 also shows the association between the pre-issue market-to-book ratio 
and subsequent operating performance.  The coefficient estimate of the market-to-book 
ratio prior to the SEO is significantly positive in the year of the SEO and in the 
subsequent year; the coefficient is also significantly positive in the fifth year following 
the SEO.  The positive association between pre-issue market-to-book ratio and post-issue 
operating performance suggests that SEO firms with a higher market-to-book ratio are 
more likely to be growth firms.  Such evidence indicates the problem of the previous 
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studies that use the market-to-book ratio at the time of the equity issuance as a proxy for 
market timing opportunities. 
In addition, Table 3.5 shows the association between pre-issue stock price run-up 
and post-issue operating performance.  In the two years subsequent to the SEO, firms 
with higher pre-issue stock returns have better operating performance.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that SEO firms with higher pre-issue stock returns are more likely to 
be growth firms. 
To summarize, the findings on post-issue operating performance is consistent 
with the hypothesis that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales are more likely to 
issue seasoned equity to time the equity market, while SEO firms with a higher pre-issue 
market-to-book ratio or stock price run-up are more likely to be growth firms. 
 
5.5. Capital Structure 
As discussed previously, the literature on the persistency of market timing effects 
on capital structure provides mixed findings.   Using pre-issue insider trading as a proxy 
for market timing opportunities at the time of the SEO, I examine whether the market 
timers are different in changes in capital structures from other SEO firms.  Specifically, I 
study how pre-issue insider trading is related to the level of leverage, the changes in 
leverage, and the amount of equity issues and debt issues in the years around the SEO. 
As a first step, I examine whether SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales are 
more levered prior to the SEO.  As discussed previously in sub-section 5.3, there are 
several alternative explanations for why SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales 
issue more equity.  Alternative to the market timing hypothesis, SEO firms with more 
abnormal insider sales may issue more equity because they are more over-levered prior to 
the SEO and they issue more equity in the SEO to revert to their target leverage ratios.  
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To examine this alternative hypothesis, I run a regression of pre-issue leverage ratio on 
Abnormal Sales Percentage and control variables. 
Results of this regression are reported in the first row in Table 3.6.  Controlling 
for other firm characteristics, SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales are 
significantly less levered in the year prior to the SEO.  This evidence is contrary to the 
hypothesis that such firms issue more equity because they are more over-levered prior to 
the SEO and they issue more equity to revert to target leverage ratios.  Rather, this 
evidence is consistent with the market timing behavior of such firms; they issue more 
equity regardless of their comparatively low leverage. 
Next, I examine how pre-issue insider trading is associated with capital structure 
decisions following the SEO. 
To examine the relation between capital structure and insider trading in a 
multivariate setting, I run regression of book leverage on abnormal sales percentage and 
control variables, for each of the five years following the SEO.  Results are reported in 
the last five rows of Table 3.6. 
SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales are less levered in the next a few 
years, after controlling for various determinants of capital structure.  However, the 
amount of such under-leverage gradually decreases in magnitude and significance level 
in subsequent years, and becomes insignificant in the third year following the SEO.  In 
other words, following the equity issuance, SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales 
reverse their capital structures more than SEO firms with less abnormal insider sales.  
The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that market timers, or SEO firms with 
more abnormal insider sales, reverse the effects of market timing on their capital 
structures gradually subsequent to the SEO. 
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Evidence on post-issue capital structure decisions can also be provided by 
examining the cumulative changes or annual changes in leverage.  Table 3.7 presents the 
findings from the regressions of cumulative changes in capital structure.  Given the 
earlier finding that the SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales issue more equity, it 
is not surprising that the cumulative change in leverage from the year prior to the SEO to 
the year after the SEO is significantly more negative.  However, the cumulative change in 
capital structure of such firms becomes insignificantly in the third years following the 
SEO, which suggests that the impact of market timing of such firms on capital structure is 
reversed within three years. 
Table 3.8 presents the findings from the regressions of annual changes in 
leverage.  Consistent with the earlier findings, in the year of the SEO, firms with more 
abnormal insider sales reduce their leverage more significantly.  In addition, there is 
evidence that such firms subsequently increase leverage significantly more.  Specifically, 
in year five subsequent to the SEO, such firms have a significantly positive change in 
leverage, controlling for other determinants of capital structure.  Such increase in 
leverage would help these firms to reverse the impact of market timing on their capital 
structure.  In contrast, there is no evidence that firms with a higher pre-issue market-to-
book ratio increase leverage more significantly in the years subsequent to the SEO. 
Finally, to further investigate whether pre-issue insider trading activity is 
associated with how firms actively reverse the effects of the SEO on their capital 
structures, I examine the amount of net debt issues and net equity issues in multivariate 
regressions.  Results of these regressions are presented in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10.  
Table 3.10 provides evidence that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales issue less 
equity in year five following the SEO.  
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To summarize, the evidence suggests that SEO firms with more abnormal insider 
sales, who are more likely to be market timers, gradually reverse the effects of the SEO 
on their capital structures in the following years.  There is some evidence that such firms 
issue significantly less equity subsequent to the SEO. 
 
6.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
6.1. Hot Market Effects 
As discussed previously, Alti (2006) uses equity market volume as a proxy for 
aggregate market timing opportunities, and finds evidence that IPOs completed in hot 
equity markets are more likely to be market timers and IPOs completed in cold equity 
market are more likely to be growth firms.  The hot and cold equity market classification 
captures variations in market-wide timing opportunities.  The advantage of this aggregate 
market timing measure is that it is isolated from confounding effects of other 
idiosyncratic determinants of financing policy at the firm level.  However, this market-
wide timing measure is not designed to capture idiosyncratic variations in market timing 
opportunity across firms, unlike the insider trading measures developed in this essay. 
To make sure that the findings in the main analyses are not driven by the hot 
market effects documented by Alti (2006), I run the multivariate regressions in the main 
analyses on Abnormal Sales Percentage, a Hot Market dummy variable, and other control 
variables.  The Hot Market Dummy equals one for SEOs completed in hot equity markets 
and zero for other SEOs.  Following Alti (2006), hot equity markets are defined based on 
aggregate monthly volume of equity issues.26 
                                                 
26 See Alti (2006) for detailed definition for hot markets and cold markets.  
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Table 3.11 reports the results of the regressions controlling for hot market effects.  
Consistent with the findings from the main analyses, SEO firms with more abnormal 
insider sales issue more equity and less debt in the year of the SEO.  They hold more 
proceeds in cash balance and pay out more dividends at the same time.  They do not 
invest more heavily in the year of the SEO.  Subsequent to the SEO, they do not reduce 
the amount of cash held or invest more heavily.  In addition, such SEO firms have worse 
operating performance in the third year following the SEO.  Finally, the evidence on 
book leverage and cumulative changes in book leverage suggests that such firms 
gradually reverse the effects of SEO on their capital structures in the following years.  
There is also evidence that SEO firms with more pre-issue abnormal insider sales issue 
significantly less equity in year five following the SEO. 
Table 3.11 also provides evidence on the real activities of firms that issue 
seasoned equity in a hot equity.  Controlling for the level of pre-issue abnormal insider 
sales and other firm characteristics, SEO issuers in hot equity markets issue more equity 
than other issuers, which is consistent with the findings from a sample of IPO firms in 
Alti (2006).  However, hot market SEO firms do not hold more proceeds in cash or have 
more dividend payments in the year of the SEO, and they do reduce their cash balances in 
the years following the SEO.  Finally, these SEO firms issue less debt in the fifth year 
and less equity in the first and third year following the SEO. 
To summarize, the findings in this sub-section suggest that the evidence in this 
study are robust after controlling for the hot market effects. In addition, the evidence 
suggests that controlling for pre-issue insider trading activity, the hot market effects are 
not as strong for the SEO firms in the sample of this essay as for the IPO firms in the 
sample examined by Alti (2006). 
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6.2. Alternative Measurers of Insider Trading 
In the main analyses, I measure pre-issue insider trading by the level of abnormal 
insider sales occurred in the six months prior to the issue date of the SEO, adjusted for 
the historical level of insider sales. In this sub-section, I examine whether the findings in 
the main analyses are robust to alternative measures of pre-issue insider trading. 
 
6.2.1. Insider Trades Measured by SEC Receipt Date 
In the main analyses, insider trades are measured by transaction date and 
summarized in the six months prior to the SEO.  In this sub-section, I measure insider 
trades by the report date (SEC Receipt Date) rather than the transaction date, and 
examine whether the results in the main analyses are robust to this alternative measure of 
insider trading.  Insider trades captured by this measure are publicly known at the time of 
the SEO. 
I construct Abnormal Sales Percentage by SEC Receipt Date, a variable that 
equals the percentage of insider sales reported in the six months prior to the SEO, minus 
the average percentage of insider sales reported in the year starting at two years prior to 
the SEO.  An un-tabulated test suggests that the Abnormal Sales Percentage by SEC 
Receipt Date is highly correlated with the Abnormal Sales Percentage by the transaction 
date used in the main analyses.  The correlation between these two variables is 0.91. 
As a robustness test, I perform the regressions in the main analyses on the 
Abnormal Sales Percentage by SEC Receipt Date and control variables.  Table 3.12 
presents the findings.  Consistent with the findings in the main analyses, firms with more 
abnormal insider sales issue more equity and issue less debt in the year of the SEO.  They 
are associated with more dividend payout and increase in cash balance, and they do not 
use the proceeds from the SEO to make more capital investments.  Finally, following the 
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SEO, the impact of the equity issuance on their capital structure gradually reverses.  
There exists evidence that such firms issue less equity in year five following the SEO. 
 
6.2.2. Abnormal Sales Percentage Adjusted for Firm Characteristics and Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Insiders may trade for reasons other than private information on firm value.  This 
is especially important for my study because equity issuance usually follows a large stock 
price run-up, which increases the insiders’ wealth in their own company.  In addition, it is 
possible that there exist unobservable firm characteristics that are potentially associated 
with the expected level of insider sales.  In the multivariate regressions in the main 
analyses, I do control for prior stock price run-up, a variable that might be associated 
with insiders’ diversification need.  I also control for firm characteristics such as size, the 
market-to-book ratio, and days since IPO, which are variables that might be associated 
with insiders’ incentive to sell.  Nevertheless, to further control for the potential 
heteroskadasticity of insider trading activities across firms that are not related to the 
insiders’ perception of firm value, I construct a measure of abnormal insider trading by 
running a regression of percentage of insider sales on firm characteristics such as pre-
issue stock run-up, the market-to-book ratio, and firm size, controlling for firm fixed 
effects.  Residuals from this regression, the Abnormal Sales Percentage adjusted for firm 
characteristics and firm fixed effects, are taken as an alternative measure of abnormal 
insider sales. 
As a robustness check, I perform the regressions specified in the main analyses 
using this alternative abnormal insider sales measure adjusted for firm characteristics and 
fixed effects.  Table 3.13 presents the findings using this alternative measure of insider 
trading.  Consistent with the findings from the main analyses, firms with more abnormal 
insider sales issue more equity in the year of the SEO.  They use the extra proceeds to 
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increase cash balance, rather than making more capital investments.  In addition, these 
firms have worse operating performance in the second and third year following the SEO. 
 
6.2.3. Pure Insider Sales  
In this sub-section, I measure insider trading by the level of insider sales rather 
than the abnormal level of insider sales.  Following Lee (1997), I categorize the SEO 
firms in the sample by insider trading activities prior to the issue date into the following 
groups: (1) SEO firms with pure insider sales, or issuers with all trades by top executives 
being sales during the six months prior to the SEO; (2) other SEO firms.  To the extent 
that consensus among insiders conveys the strongest signal of consistent inside 
information about the firm value, SEO firms with uniform insider sales are more likely to 
be reliably associated with insider’s perception of over-valuation of stock price.  I define 
Pure Insider Sales as a dummy that equals one for the first group of SEO firms and zero 
for the second group, and examine the difference in investment, operating, and financing 
decisions between these two groups in multivariate regressions. 
Table 3.14 presents the findings of the regressions on the Pure Insider Sales 
dummy and control variables.  Consistent with the findings from the main analyses, SEO 
firms with pure insider sales issue more equity and less debt in the year of the SEO.  
They significantly increase cash balance in the year of the SEO and do not reverse it in 
later years.  They do not invest more than other firms. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Insiders of SEO firms have private information about the firms’ value and future 
prospects, and they could use this private information to trade their own shares prior to 
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SEOs.  This essay examines how insider trading activity prior to SEOs is related to 
subsequent investment, operating and financing decisions of the issuer. 
I find that SEO firms with more abnormal insider sales issue more seasoned 
equity.  Such firms do not make more investments; rather, they hold the extra proceeds in 
cash balance and increase dividend payouts more.  There also exists weak evidence that 
such firms tend to have worse operating performance and they issue less equity 
subsequently to reverse the effects of equity issuance on their capital structures. 
These findings suggest that insiders have superior information about the firm 
value and they use this information to time both personal trades and public equity 
offerings.  Insider trading activity prior to SEOs provides valuable information about the 
firms’ incentives to issue seasoned equities.  In addition, insider information about the 
issuer’s valuation not only influences the firm’s decision to issue seasoned equity, but 
also has an impact on the firm’s real activities following the SEO.  Pre-issue Insider 
trading activity helps predict subsequent investment, operating, and financing decisions 






Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A presents the number of firm-year observations, mean and standard deviation of 
the main variables.  Level of capital investments is measured by the amount of capital 
expenditures divided by sales.  Panel B presents the distribution of the Entrenchment 
Index.  Panel C presents the correlation between the main variables.  The level of 
abnormal capital investments is calculated as the difference between the level of actual 
and expected capital investments, where the level of expected capital investments of a 
firm in a given year is calculated as the average level of its capital investments in the past 
three years.  Panel D presents the mean value of the key variables for firms in the low, 
middle, and high entrenchment groups, and the difference between the low and high 
entrenchment groups.  *, **, and *** represent significance level at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
 





Observations MEAN STD 
Market Equity (in Millions) 20,862 5,486 19,953 
Total Assets (in Millions) 20,872 10,017 45,095 
Sales  (in Millions) 20,841 4,077 11,198 
Market to Book 18,896 1.75 1.28 
Capital Investments 19,105 8.54% 15.9% 
Entrenchment Index 20,875 2.08 1.34 
 
 




Frequency  of 
Firm-Year 




0 3,066 14.7% 
1 4,124 19.8% 
Low 34.4% 
2 5,433 26.0% Middle 26.0% 
3 5,134 24.6% 
4 2,529 12.1% 
5 519 2.5% 
6 70 0.3% 
High 39.5% 
Total number of 
firm-year 
observations 
20,875 100.00%  100.00% 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (Continued) 
 













Sales E Index 
Capital Investments  1.000       
Abnormal Capital 
Investments 
0.301 1.000      
Market Equity -0.006 0.009 1.000     
Market to Book -0.008 0.000 0.255 1.000    
Total Assets -0.024 0.006 0.492 -0.045 1.000   
Sales -0.040 0.011 0.663 0.009 0.530 1.000  
Entrenchment Index -0.003 0.014 -0.103 -0.093 -0.074 -0.097 1.000 
 
 



















Low 8,035 1.87 15,125 5,454 8.51% -0.95% 
Middle 4,550 1.79 6,775 3,641 8.86% -0.97% 
High 3,879 1.63 7,700 3,164 8.36% -0.56% 
 



















Table 2.2: Regression of Capital Investment on the Entrenchment Index 
This table presents the regressions of the level of capital investments and the level of 
abnormal capital investments on the Entrenchment Index, and other firm characteristics 
including lagged market-to-book ratio, lagged book leverage, lagged cash, firm age, 
lagged firm size, past stock performance, and lagged capital investments.  Regressions 
are clustered at firm level.  Industry Dummies and year dummies are included in the 
regressions (coefficients on these dummy variables are suppressed from the table).  The t-
statistics, reported in italics, are robust to heteroskedasticity and within cluster 







 Capital Investment Abnormal Capital Investment 
   









     
Entrenchment 
Index 
      0.002 *** 3.785       0.002 *** 3.277 
Market-to-book 
Ratio 
      0.002 *** 2.856       0.004 *** 2.932 
Book Leverage 
 
     -0.020 *** -5.345      -0.039 *** -5.547 
Cash 
 
      0.019 * 1.668       0.003 0.201 
Firm Age 
 
      0.000 -0.536       0.000 *** 5.650 
Firm Size 
 




     -0.003 -1.470      -0.007 *** -3.273 
Lagged Capital 
Investment 
      0.668 *** 24.665      -0.184 *** -4.309 
 













Table 2.3: Stock Performance and Capital Investments, and Stock Performance and 
Corporate Governance 
Panel A presents the mean monthly abnormal stock returns for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments.  Panel B presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return 
for different groups of the Entrenchment Index.  Abnormal stock return of an individual 
stock is calculated following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). The 
numbers in the table are in percentage.  *, **, and *** represent a significant difference 




Abnormal Capital Investment Abnormal Stock Return 
  




Highest 5 -0.014 
  



















Table 2.4: Stock Performance, Capital Investments and Corporate Governance 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments and different groups of the Entrenchment Index.  Abnormal 
stock return is calculated following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).  
Abnormal stock return of an individual stock is calculated following Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers (1997). The numbers in the table are in percentage.  *, **, and *** 
represent a significant difference at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. 
  
   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.328 0.046 0.214 





-0.042 -0.167 -0.093 0.025 
4 -0.143 -0.008 -0.318 
Highest 5 0.149 -0.075 -0.129 
  0.256 * 














Table 2.5: Regression Results for Portfolios Formed on Capital Investment and 
Corporate Governance 
This table presents the coefficient estimates from the regressions of monthly abnormal 
returns of different portfolios constructed based on the abnormal capital investment 
quintiles and the Entrenchment Index groups on the Carhart (1997) four factors: Rp,t = 
αp + βMKT,p (RMKT,t - Rf,t) + βSMB,p RSMB,t+ βHML,p RHML,t + βPR1YR,p 
RPR1YR,t + εp,t .  Abnormal stock return of an individual stock in the portfolio is 
calculated as its stock return minus the weighted average returns of its benchmark firms 
based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).  The alphas reported in the 







Dependent Variable:  
Monthly Abnormal Stock Returns for Portfolios based on the Abnormal Capital 
Investment Quintile and the Entrenchment Index Group 












(1,2 – 4,5) 
 






























       
       
αp 0.287 0.177 0.283 ** 0.344 0.080 0.347 ** 
 1.253 0.905 2.106 1.506 0.521 2.063 
       
αMKT,p -8.969 2.499 -5.016 -3.960 5.702 2.513 
 -1.481 0.399 -1.246 -0.604 1.379 0.511 
       
αSMB,p 8.010 7.959 2.762 5.776 -17.562 *** 4.241 
 1.254 1.347 0.700 0.976 -3.895 0.726 
       
αHML,p -19.176 ** -11.465 6.344 -36.098 *** -14.511 ** -0.036 
 -2.290 -1.402 1.170 -4.560 -2.599 -0.006 
       
αPR1YR,p 9.227 -2.793 6.900 * -7.689 5.348 -12.771 *** 
 1.371 -0.366 1.931 -1.193 1.436 -2.609 





Table 2.6: Earnings Announcement Returns and Capital Investments, and Earnings 
Announcement Returns and Corporate Governance 
Panel A presents the mean cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns for 
different quintiles of abnormal capital investments.  Panel B presents the cumulative 
abnormal earnings announcement returns for different groups of the Entrenchment Index.  
Cumulative earnings announcement return is calculated as the twelve-day cumulative 
stock return centered at the four quarterly earnings announcements dates (day minus one 
to day plus one around each announcement) in the year after the portfolio formation.  The 
cumulative abnormal earnings announcement return of an individual stock is calculated 
as the difference between the cumulative earnings announcement return of the stock and 
that of its Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) benchmark portfolio.  The 
numbers in the table are in percentage.  *, **, and *** represent a significant difference 
at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 
Abnormal Capital Investment 
Cumulative Abnormal Earnings 
Announcement Return 
  
  Lowest 1  0.086 
              2  0.574 
              3 -0.412 
              4  0.511 
 Highest 5 -0.124 
  




Entrenchment Index Group 
Cumulative Abnormal Earnings 
Announcement Return 
  
Low  0.055 
Middle  0.608 
High -0.273 
  





Table 2.7: Earnings Announcement Returns, Capital Investments and Corporate 
Governance 
This table presents the mean annual cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns 
for different quintiles of abnormal capital investments and different groups of the 
Entrenchment Index.  Cumulative earnings announcement return is calculated as the 
twelve-day cumulative stock return centered at the four quarterly earnings 
announcements dates (day minus one to day plus one around each announcement) in the 
year after the portfolio formation.  The cumulative abnormal earnings announcement 
return of an individual stock is calculated as the difference between the cumulative 
earnings announcement return of the stock and that of its Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997) benchmark portfolio.  The numbers in the table are in percentage.  *, **, 
and *** represent a significant difference at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
   
Entrenchment Index Group Cumulative Abnormal 
Earnings Announcement 
Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1  0.268 -0.317  0.162 





-0.698 -0.347  0.509 -1.206 
4  0.739  1.427  1.025 
Highest 5 -0.468  2.176 -0.789 
  1.042* 
 















Table 2.8: Sub-period Test: July 1991 to June 1999 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments and different groups of the Entrenchment Index, for the 




Abnormal Capital Investment Abnormal Stock Return  
  




Highest 5 -0.122 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.162 -0.254 0.349 





0.035 -0.114 -0.146 0.180 
4 -0.199 -0.198 -0.340 
Highest 5 0.150 -0.404 -0.260 
  0.342 * 














Table 2.9: Sub-period Test: July 1999 to June 2006 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments and different groups of the Entrenchment Index, for the 




Abnormal Capital Investment Abnormal Stock Return 
  




Highest 5 0.109 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.516 0.389 0.061 





-0.130 -0.228 -0.033 -0.097 
4 -0.079 0.210 -0.293 
Highest 5 0.147 0.302 0.020 
0.158 









-0.044 0.227  
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Table 2.10: Robustness Test: Excluding Equity Issuance Effects 1 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments and different groups of the Entrenchment Index, excluding 




Abnormal Capital Investment Abnormal Stock Return 
  




Highest 5 -0.087 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.249 -0.317 0.365 





0.029 -0.140 -0.079 0.109 
4 -0.204 -0.178 -0.293 
Highest 5 0.203 -0.242 -0.342 
    0.378 ** 












Table 2.11: Robustness Test: Excluding Equity Issuance Effects 2 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments and different groups of the Entrenchment Index, excluding 




Abnormal Capital Investment Abnormal Stock Return 
  




Highest 5 -0.065 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.249 -0.214 0.362 





0.044 -0.028 -0.029 0.072 
4 -0.245 -0.204 -0.284 
Highest 5 0.240 -0.219 -0.336 
    0.370 ** 













 Table 2.12: Robustness Test: Regression of Capital Investment on the Entrenchment 
Index as of 1990 
This table presents the regressions of the level of capital investments and the level of 
abnormal capital investments on the Entrenchment Index as of 1990, and other firm 
characteristics including lagged market-to-book ratio, lagged book leverage, lagged cash, 
firm age, lagged firm size, past stock performance, and lagged capital investments.  
Regressions are clustered at firm level.  Industry Dummies and year dummies are 
included in the regressions (coefficients on these dummy variables are suppressed from 
the table).  The t-statistics, reported in italics, are robust to heteroskedasticity and within 







 Capital Investment Abnormal Capital Investment 
   









     
Entrenchment 
Index as of 1990 
      0.002 *** 3.176       0.002 *** 2.926 
Market-to-book 
Ratio 
      0.003 *** 3.660       0.003 *** 4.464 
Book Leverage 
 
     -0.017 *** -3.017      -0.018 ** -2.356 
Cash 
 
     -0.007  -0.789       0.008 0.895 
Firm Age 
 
      0.000 -0.361       0.000 *** 2.813 
Firm Size 
 




     -0.002 -1.086      -0.005 * -1.942 
Lagged Capital 
Investment 
      0.660 *** 14.617      -0.143 *** -2.713 
 














Table 2.13: Robustness Test: Entrenchment Index of 1990 as Measure of Corporate 
Governance 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments and different groups of the Entrenchment Index (according 




Abnormal Capital Investment Abnormal Stock Return  
  




Highest 5 -0.122 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group as of 1990 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.124 -0.169 0.229 





0.074 -0.187 -0.032 0.105 
4 -0.228 -0.222 -0.326 
Highest 5 0.112 -0.481 -0.215 
0.302 * 
















Table 2.14: Robustness Test: Industry Adjusted Abnormal Capital Expenditure  
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 






Abnormal Capital Investment 
Abnormal Stock Return 
  




Highest 5 -0.171 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 -0.162 0.039 -0.060 





0.057 -0.114 -0.055 0.112 
4 0.278 -0.218 -0.184 
Highest 5 0.087 -0.427 -0.404 
    0.542 ** 











0.304 0.275  
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Table 2.15: Robustness Test: Characteristics Adjusted Abnormal Capital Expenditure  
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 






Abnormal Capital Investments 
Abnormal Stock Return 
  




Highest 5 -0.007 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.181 -0.247 -0.369 





0.177 -0.236 0.013 0.164 
4 -0.220 -0.229 -0.174 
Highest 5 0.160 -0.017 -0.327 
  0.344 * 







1,2 - 4,5 
0.129 0.000 0.239  
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Table 2.16: Robustness Check: Capital Expenditure and Mergers & Acquisitions 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal stock return for different quintiles of 
abnormal capital investments and different groups of the Entrenchment Index.  Capital 




Abnormal Capital Investment Abnormal Stock Return 
  




Highest 5 0.072 
  





















   
Entrenchment Index Group 
Abnormal Stock Return 
Low Middle High 
Difference: 
Low - High 
      
Lowest 1 0.057 -0.445 0.173 





0.095 -0.305 -0.351   0.447 * 
4 0.011 -0.177 -0.354 
Highest 5 0.256 0.083 -0.163 
      0.498 *** 













Table 3.1: Insider Trading Patterns Prior to SEOs 
Panel A reports the mean and standard deviation of number of insider trades (sales and purchases respectively) in each six-
month period in the four years prior to SEOs.  Panel B reports the level and t statistic of change of insider trades (sales and 
purchases respectively) from the Months (-12, -7) to the months (-6, -1).  
 
Panel A 
Month  Number of Insider Sales  Number of Insider Purchases 






(-48, -43)  3.3 7.9  2.0 5.1 
(-42, -37)  3.0 8.2  2.1 5.7 
(-36, -31)  3.4 8.9  1.9 4.2 
(-30, -25)  3.2 11.0  2.1 4.8 
(-24, -19)  3.2 8.0  2.2 4.9 
(-18, -13)  3.3 9.3  2.1 5.2 
(-12, -7)  4.5 10.6  2.0 4.2 
(-6, -1)  7.4 19.4  1.2 3.2 
 
Panel B 
Month  Change in Number of Insider Sales  Change in Number of Insider purchases 
  Mean T stat  Mean T stat 
(-12, -7) to (-6,-1)    2.7 6.8  -0.9 -10.0 
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Table 3.2: Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A reports the correlation coefficients between Abnormal Sales Percentage and firm characteristics at the time of the 
SEO, including Market-to-book, Prior stock return, Days since IPO, Percentage of primary shares offered in the SEO, Hot 
Equity Market Dummy (which equals 1 if an SEO is completed in a hot equity market), and Book Leverage.  Panel B reports 
the correlation coefficients between the Abnormal Sales Percentage and key variables in the multiple regressions, including 
lagged Market-to-book, lagged EBITD, lagged Size, lagged PPE, lagged R&D, and lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if 
lagged R&D value is missing). 
 





Market to Book 







Abnormal Sales Percentage 1.000
Market to Book prior to SEO 0.151 1.000
Prior Stock Return 0.041 0.154 1.000
Days Since IPO 0.265 -0.293 0.087 1.000
Primary Shares Percentage -0.054 -0.057 0.057 0.228 1.000
HOT Equity Market -0.031 0.156 0.200 -0.132 -0.021 1.000
Book Leverage prior to SEO -0.147 -0.448 -0.059 0.167 0.026 -0.086 1.000  
 




Percentage Lag MtoB Lag EBITD Lag Size Lag PPE Lag RandD LagRDD
Abnormal Sales Percentage 1.000
Lag MtoB 0.112 1.000
Lag EBITD 0.061 0.215 1.000
Lag Size 0.076 -0.238 0.300 1.000
Lag PPE -0.096 -0.240 0.243 0.232 1.000
Lag RandD 0.141 0.269 -0.270 -0.318 -0.359 1.000
Lag RDD -0.114 -0.163 0.097 0.108 0.235 -0.737 1.000  
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Table 3.3: Financing and Real Activities in the Year of the SEO 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of net equity issues, net debt issues, 
change in dividends (multiplied by 100), change in cash balance, and level of investments in the year of the SEO on Abnormal 
Sales Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the average percentage of insider sales 
in the year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged market-to-book, lagged EBITD, lagged Size, lagged PPE, lagged 
R&D, lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if lagged R&D value is missing), lagged High Leverage Dummy (which equals 1 
if lagged book leverage is above 0.8), lagged Low Leverage Dummy (which equals 1 if lagged book leverage is below 0.1), 
Prior Stock Return, Days Since IPO, Primary Shares Percentage, Book Leverage prior to SEO, year dummies, and industry 
dummies based on the forty-eight industries categorization in Fama and French (1997).  Coefficients of the year dummies and 


















BL prior to 
SEO # Obs R Square
Net Equity Issues (T=0) 0.016 0.029 -0.194 -0.049 -0.025 -0.001 0.000 -0.015 -0.032 0.023 0.000 0.176 0.010 1966 0.672
2.060 14.044 -9.399 -17.709 -1.425 -4.771 -0.023 -1.062 -2.110 10.363 -1.047 19.440 0.471
Net Debt Issues (T=0) -0.025 0.004 -0.095 0.015 -0.049 0.000 0.013 0.026 -0.009 0.001 0.000 0.016 -0.159 2006 0.126
-2.790 1.877 -4.294 5.245 -2.558 1.001 1.510 1.601 -0.543 0.262 -2.788 1.613 -7.329
Change in Cash Balance (T=0) 0.027 0.022 -0.033 -0.026 -0.011 -0.001 -0.021 0.032 0.000 0.077 -0.040 2040 0.400
2.968 9.447 -1.432 -8.354 -0.566 -3.647 -2.321 13.134 0.741 7.564 -2.111
Change in Dividends (T=0) 0.023 -0.009 -0.070 0.006 0.076 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.022 -0.060 2029 0.912
1.751 -2.651 -2.102 1.394 2.648 0.316 0.643 1.642 1.500 -1.480 -2.228
Investments (T=0) 0.006 0.005 0.064 -0.007 0.274 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.002 2017 0.499
1.252 4.031 5.402 -4.582 26.819 -1.485 -1.281 -0.614 -3.986 0.958 0.226
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Table 3.4: Investment and Changes in Cash Balance of the SEO Firms 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of changes in cash balance and level 
of investments on Abnormal Sales Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the 
average percentage of insider sales in the year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged EBITD, lagged Size, lagged PPE, 
lagged R&D, lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if lagged R&D value is missing), Market-to-book prior to the SEO, Prior 
Stock Return, Days Since IPO, Primary Shares Percentage, Book Leverage prior to SEO, year dummies, and industry dummies 
based on the forty-eight industries categorization in Fama and French (1997).  Coefficients of the year dummies and industry 





Percentage Lag EBITD Lag Size Lag PPE Lag R&D Lag RDD








BL prior to 
SEO # Obs R Square
Change in Cash Balance (T=0) 0.027 -0.033 -0.026 -0.011 -0.001 -0.021 0.022 0.032 0.000 0.077 -0.040 2040 0.400
2.968 -1.432 -8.354 -0.566 -3.647 -2.321 9.447 13.134 0.741 7.564 -2.111
Change in Cash Balance (T=1) 0.008 0.275 0.005 -0.017 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 0.028 1919 0.131
0.847 8.027 1.619 -0.775 -3.290 -0.128 -1.422 -0.720 0.508 -0.510 1.396
Change in Cash Balance (T=2) 0.009 0.091 0.005 0.026 0.000 0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.011 -0.018 1740 0.069
1.001 3.239 1.504 1.284 -2.193 0.392 -1.876 0.347 -0.456 -1.048 -0.959
Change in Cash Balance (T=3) 0.006 0.105 0.004 -0.010 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 0.000 0.009 0.036 1516 0.065
0.642 3.389 1.188 -0.436 0.456 -0.160 -0.511 -2.443 -0.348 0.796 1.701
Investments (T=0) 0.006 0.064 -0.007 0.274 0.000 -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.002 2017 0.499
1.252 5.402 -4.582 26.819 -1.485 -1.281 4.031 -0.614 -3.986 0.958 0.226
Investments (T=1) 0.006 0.108 -0.009 0.254 0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.022 -0.005 1897 0.507
1.299 6.646 -5.376 24.074 -1.569 -1.010 4.212 2.783 -2.477 4.302 -0.580
Investments (T=2) -0.001 0.102 -0.006 0.212 0.000 -0.010 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.015 -0.007 1718 0.471
-0.308 7.642 -3.843 21.798 -0.941 -2.183 0.760 1.682 -1.839 3.138 -0.769
Investments  (T=3) 0.002 0.115 -0.005 0.176 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.008 -0.001 1500 0.456
0.413 9.066 -3.525 18.615 -1.725 -0.724 2.270 0.632 -0.452 1.666 -0.104
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Table 3.5: Operating Performance of the SEO Firms 
 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of EBITD on Abnormal Sales 
Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the average percentage of insider sales in the 
year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged Size, lagged PPE, lagged R&D, lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if 
lagged R&D value is missing), Market-to-book prior to the SEO, Prior Stock Return, Days Since IPO, Primary Shares 
Percentage, Book Leverage prior to SEO, year dummies, and industry dummies based on the forty-eight industries 
categorization in Fama and French (1997).  Coefficients of the year dummies and industry dummies are subsided from the 
















BL prior to 
SEO # Obs R Square
EBITD (T=0) -0.011 0.032 0.078 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.012 0.000 -0.081 -0.014 2044 0.497
-1.524 14.370 5.057 -0.585 1.424 2.047 6.116 0.506 -10.445 -0.941
EBITD (T=1) 0.007 0.041 0.095 -0.001 0.033 0.007 0.010 0.000 -0.080 -0.035 1909 0.473
0.815 14.190 4.773 -3.227 3.665 2.939 3.960 2.667 -8.335 -1.930
EBITD (T=2) 0.005 0.039 0.095 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.072 -0.015 1734 0.454
0.526 14.009 4.790 0.262 2.301 0.637 0.312 1.584 -7.454 -0.814
EBITD (T=3) -0.021 0.040 0.117 0.000 0.030 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.062 0.003 1518 0.471
-2.275 13.925 5.646 0.532 3.201 0.990 -0.186 1.829 -6.209 0.151
EBITD (T=4) -0.015 0.038 0.084 -0.002 0.031 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.048 0.017 1317 0.469
-1.578 12.457 3.909 -5.679 3.034 1.346 0.782 1.946 -4.429 0.847
EBITD (T=5) -0.013 0.037 0.107 0.000 0.018 0.007 -0.005 0.000 -0.041 -0.016 1150 0.428




Table 3.6: Capital Structure of the SEO Firms 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of book leverage on Abnormal Sales 
Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the average percentage of insider sales in the 
year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged market-to-book, lagged EBITD, lagged Size, lagged PPE, lagged R&D, 
lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if lagged R&D value is missing), Market-to-book prior to the SEO, Prior Stock Return, 
Days Since IPO, Primary Shares Percentage, Book Leverage prior to SEO, year dummies, and industry dummies based on the 
forty-eight industries categorization in Fama and French (1997).  Coefficients of the year dummies and industry dummies are 


















BL prior to 
SEO # Obs R Square
BL (T=-1) -0.089 -0.019 -0.156 0.047 0.119 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.000 0.048 1496 0.372
-7.321 -5.208 -4.730 11.951 4.159 1.355 0.730 1.740 -0.172 3.183
BL (T=0) -0.026 -0.008 -0.118 0.029 -0.019 0.001 0.003 -0.016 0.000 -0.051 0.595 2027 0.739
-3.950 -4.316 -6.851 12.492 -1.255 4.084 0.465 -8.647 -1.716 -6.777 42.384
BL (T=1) -0.016 -0.013 -0.416 0.035 0.094 0.001 0.008 -0.005 -0.010 0.000 -0.058 0.507 1872 0.640
-1.893 -4.475 -13.409 11.854 4.724 3.581 0.908 -2.081 -4.171 -2.244 -5.942 28.655
BL (T=2) -0.026 -0.016 -0.336 0.037 0.108 0.000 0.004 -0.005 -0.009 0.000 -0.018 0.437 1702 0.559
-2.652 -5.262 -10.939 11.019 4.905 1.983 0.351 -1.930 -3.308 -2.314 -1.617 21.620
BL (T=3) -0.017 -0.016 -0.404 0.040 0.095 0.001 0.009 -0.004 -0.013 0.000 -0.007 0.386 1480 0.492
-1.533 -4.356 -11.417 10.016 3.668 2.259 0.727 -1.462 -4.050 -1.984 -0.539 16.113
BL (T=4) -0.020 -0.017 -0.407 0.039 0.103 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 0.000 0.002 0.328 1291 0.462
-1.635 -4.387 -10.095 9.167 3.622 2.391 -0.028 -0.923 -2.857 -1.134 0.151 12.256
BL (T=5) -0.006 -0.018 -0.410 0.040 0.103 0.000 0.027 -0.004 -0.010 0.000 -0.012 0.355 1115 0.470
-0.434 -4.332 -9.131 8.772 3.265 -0.206 1.794 -0.994 -2.488 -1.466 -0.793 12.324
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Table 3.7: Cumulative Changes in Capital Structure of the SEO Firms 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of cumulative changes in book 
leverage on Abnormal Sales Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the average 
percentage of insider sales in the year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged market-to-book, lagged EBITD, lagged 
Size, lagged PPE, lagged R&D, lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if lagged R&D value is missing), lagged Investment, 
Market-to-book prior to the SEO, Prior Stock Return, Days Since IPO, Primary Shares Percentage, Book Leverage prior to 
SEO, year dummies, and industry dummies based on the forty-eight industries categorization in Fama and French (1997).  


















BL prior to 
SEO # Obs R Square
Cumulative Change in BL (T=1) -0.017 -0.013 -0.426 0.036 0.030 0.001 0.009 0.182 -0.006 -0.010 0.000 -0.061 -0.489 1851 0.419
-1.968 -4.519 -13.738 12.153 1.148 3.563 1.041 3.777 -2.560 -4.336 -1.879 -6.233 -27.695
Cumulative Change in BL (T=2) -0.026 -0.016 -0.339 0.037 0.098 0.000 0.004 0.033 -0.005 -0.009 0.000 -0.018 -0.563 1682 0.424
-2.665 -5.287 -10.897 11.015 3.391 1.978 0.354 0.560 -1.969 -3.351 -2.270 -1.669 -27.849
Cumulative Change in BL (T=3) -0.018 -0.016 -0.399 0.040 0.116 0.000 0.008 -0.081 -0.004 -0.013 0.000 -0.006 -0.615 1466 0.424
-1.551 -4.279 -11.212 9.953 3.620 2.207 0.687 -1.110 -1.406 -4.012 -2.018 -0.463 -25.657
Cumulative Change in BL (T=4) -0.020 -0.017 -0.401 0.039 0.123 0.001 -0.001 -0.090 -0.003 -0.010 0.000 0.003 -0.673 1280 0.452
-1.631 -4.229 -9.816 9.113 3.592 2.417 -0.058 -1.051 -0.888 -2.842 -1.147 0.199 -25.104
Cumulative Change in BL (T=5) -0.006 -0.017 -0.404 0.040 0.116 0.000 0.027 -0.064 -0.003 -0.009 0.000 -0.011 -0.644 1108 0.445




Table 3.8: Changes in Capital Structure of the SEO Firms 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of annual changes in book leverage on 
Abnormal Sales Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the average percentage of 
insider sales in the year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged market-to-book, lagged EBITD, lagged Size, lagged 
PPE, lagged R&D, lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if lagged R&D value is missing), lagged Investment, lagged High 
Leverage Dummy (which equals 1 if lagged book leverage is above 0.8), lagged Low Leverage Dummy (which equals 1 if 
lagged book leverage is below 0.1), Market-to-book prior to the SEO, Prior Stock Return, Days Since IPO, Primary Shares 
Percentage, Book Leverage prior to SEO, year dummies, and industry dummies based on the forty-eight industries 
categorization in Fama and French (1997).  Coefficients of the year dummies and industry dummies are subsided from the 























BL prior to 
SEO # Obs R Square
Change in BL (T=0) -0.026 -0.008 -0.118 0.029 -0.019 0.001 0.003 0.047 0.058 0.022 -0.016 0.000 -0.051 -0.405 2006 0.368
-3.950 -4.316 -6.851 12.492 -1.255 4.084 0.465 1.393 4.625 1.763 -8.647 -1.716 -6.777 -28.851
Change in BL (T=1) 0.006 -0.005 -0.141 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.005 0.134 -0.067 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.049 1870 0.138
0.824 -2.284 -5.624 -1.310 -0.211 -0.376 0.640 3.447 -3.720 0.867 -0.856 -0.467 -1.337 0.400 -3.246
Change in BL (T=2) -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 -0.002 -0.017 0.000 -0.002 0.065 -0.061 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.031 -0.040 1714 0.100
-0.849 -3.701 -0.531 -0.762 -0.816 -0.892 -0.259 1.541 -3.362 1.123 1.319 0.817 -1.613 3.977 -2.655
Change in BL (T=3) 0.006 -0.006 -0.025 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -0.003 0.039 -0.120 0.019 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.008 -0.023 1495 0.105
0.825 -2.552 -1.029 -0.163 -0.742 -1.026 -0.376 0.796 -6.914 1.571 1.104 0.124 -1.477 0.983 -1.416
Change in BL (T=4) 0.001 -0.008 -0.050 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.029 -0.107 0.029 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.029 1309 0.105
0.092 -3.153 -1.996 0.384 -0.109 1.975 -0.761 0.550 -6.168 2.317 0.587 -0.654 0.232 0.172 -1.755
Change in BL (T=5) 0.018 -0.008 -0.103 0.003 -0.015 0.000 0.008 0.093 -0.133 0.032 0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.009 0.018 1140 0.123
2.047 -3.144 -3.470 0.988 -0.637 0.265 0.795 1.517 -6.122 2.332 0.457 -1.693 -1.791 -0.929 0.944
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Table 3.9: Net Debt Issues of the SEO Firms 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of net debt issues on Abnormal Sales 
Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the average percentage of insider sales in the 
year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged market-to-book, lagged EBITD, lagged Size, lagged PPE, lagged R&D, 
lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if lagged R&D value is missing), lagged Investment, lagged High Leverage Dummy 
(which equals 1 if lagged book leverage is above 0.8), lagged Low Leverage Dummy (which equals 1 if lagged book leverage 
is below 0.1), Market-to-book prior to the SEO, Prior Stock Return, Days Since IPO, Primary Shares Percentage, Book 
Leverage prior to SEO, year dummies, and industry dummies based on the forty-eight industries categorization in Fama and 
French (1997).  Coefficients of the year dummies and industry dummies are subsided from the tables.  Robust T-statistics are 




























to SEO # Obs R Square
Net Debt Issues (T=0) -0.025 0.004 -0.095 0.015 -0.049 0.000 0.013 0.187 0.026 -0.009 0.001 0.000 0.016 -0.159 2006 0.126
-2.790 1.877 -4.294 5.245 -2.558 1.001 1.510 4.291 1.601 -0.543 0.262 -2.788 1.613 -7.329
Net Debt Issues (T=1) -0.001 0.004 -0.044 0.003 -0.043 0.000 0.009 0.246 -0.071 0.007 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.026 1869 0.134
-0.100 1.401 -1.372 0.867 -1.596 -1.382 0.980 4.972 -3.092 0.603 -2.554 -0.193 -2.423 1.049 1.370
Net Debt Issues (T=2) -0.002 0.004 0.078 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.055 -0.091 0.013 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.016 1709 0.113
-0.227 1.563 2.876 -0.084 -0.287 -0.742 -0.279 1.073 -4.100 1.030 -0.312 0.437 -1.651 3.518 0.845
Net Debt Issues (T=3) 0.007 0.011 0.030 0.005 -0.044 0.000 -0.012 0.147 -0.107 0.022 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.015 -0.002 1491 0.124
0.772 3.414 0.992 1.527 -1.604 0.312 -1.244 2.371 -4.802 1.469 -0.584 -0.249 -0.819 1.396 -0.093
Net Debt Issues (T=4) 0.003 0.008 -0.007 0.006 0.013 0.000 -0.017 0.125 -0.132 0.026 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.015 1305 0.138
0.312 2.531 -0.214 1.722 0.491 -0.717 -1.659 1.931 -6.177 1.665 -0.311 0.811 1.045 -0.212 0.746
Net Debt Issues (T=5) 0.005 0.012 -0.037 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.008 0.149 -0.135 0.027 0.003 -0.006 0.000 -0.022 0.050 1135 0.125
0.449 3.652 -0.992 0.155 0.479 -0.022 0.682 1.928 -4.956 1.547 0.924 -1.893 -1.185 -1.772 2.072
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Table 3.10: Net Equity Issues of the SEO Firms 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions of net equity issues on Abnormal 
Sales Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the SEO, minus the average percentage of insider sales 
in the year starting at two years prior to the SEO), lagged market-to-book, lagged EBITD, lagged Size, lagged PPE, lagged 
R&D, lagged RDD dummy (which equals 1 if lagged R&D value is missing), lagged Investment, lagged High Leverage 
Dummy (which equals 1 if lagged book leverage is above 0.8), lagged Low Leverage Dummy (which equals 1 if lagged book 
leverage is below 0.1), Market-to-book prior to the SEO, Prior Stock Return, Days Since IPO, Primary Shares Percentage, 
Book Leverage prior to SEO, year dummies, and industry dummies based on the forty-eight industries categorization in Fama 
and French (1997).  Coefficients of the year dummies and industry dummies are subsided from the tables.  Robust T-statistics 




























to SEO # Obs R Square
Net Equity Issues (T=0) 0.016 0.029 -0.194 -0.049 -0.025 -0.001 0.000 0.076 -0.015 -0.032 0.023 0.000 0.176 0.010 1966 0.672
2.060 14.044 -9.399 -17.709 -1.425 -4.771 -0.023 1.862 -1.062 -2.110 10.363 -1.047 19.440 0.471
Net Equity Issues (T=1) -0.004 0.029 -0.239 -0.007 -0.022 -0.001 0.000 0.059 0.026 -0.042 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.028 -0.004 1847 0.201
-0.422 9.246 -6.900 -2.042 -0.770 -1.914 -0.050 1.096 1.037 -3.131 -1.519 -0.673 -1.349 2.578 -0.214
Net Equity Issues (T=2) 0.008 0.031 -0.288 -0.005 -0.011 0.000 0.015 0.120 -0.009 -0.045 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.013 -0.013 1688 0.237
0.857 11.072 -9.919 -1.609 -0.421 -0.543 1.560 2.189 -0.369 -3.346 -3.622 0.092 0.558 1.231 -0.681
Net Equity Issues (T=3) -0.008 0.034 -0.329 0.001 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.059 -0.035 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.028 -0.015 1476 0.295
-0.850 11.546 -11.306 0.376 0.684 1.624 0.040 1.288 2.792 -2.409 -1.767 -0.923 -0.519 2.671 -0.735
Net Equity Issues (T=4) -0.002 0.036 -0.384 -0.002 0.024 -0.001 0.006 0.126 0.037 -0.070 -0.007 0.003 0.000 0.018 -0.049 1289 0.363
-0.240 11.600 -11.976 -0.478 0.892 -2.631 0.616 1.879 1.666 -4.333 -2.669 1.197 0.362 1.600 -2.311
Net Equity Issues (T=5) -0.024 0.037 -0.326 -0.004 0.018 0.000 0.002 0.084 0.059 -0.032 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.014 -0.024 1126 0.348
-2.338 11.598 -9.155 -1.175 0.626 -0.053 0.137 1.141 2.252 -1.946 -0.658 1.449 0.277 1.152 -1.049
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Table 3.11: Robustness Test: Regression Controlling for Hot Market Effects 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions 
on Abnormal Sales Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the 
SEO, minus the average percentage of insider sales in the year starting at two years prior 
to the SEO), Hot Equity Market Dummy (which equals 1 if an SEO is completed in a hot 
equity market), and other control variables.  The specification of the models is the same 
as in Table 3.3 to Table 3.10, except for the inclusion of the Hot Equity Market.  
Coefficients of the control variables are subsided from the tables.  Robust T-statistics are 






Net Equity Issues (T=0) 0.014 0.014 0.675
1.690 1.706
Net Debt Issues (T=0) -0.022 0.008 0.136
-2.561 0.935
Change in Dividends (T=0) 0.023 0.000 0.912
1.756 0.227
Change in Cash Balance (T=0) 0.027 0.007 0.400
2.992 0.774
Change in Cash Balance (T=1) 0.007 -0.019 0.133
0.782 -1.848
Change in Cash Balance (T=2) 0.009 -0.004 0.070
0.990 -0.431
Change in Cash Balance (T=3) 0.006 -0.030 0.070
0.563 -2.837
Investment (T=0) -0.002 0.000 0.510
-0.463 -0.084
Investment (T=1) 0.006 0.003 0.507
1.320 0.609
Investment (T=2) -0.001 -0.004 0.471
-0.329 -0.841












EBITD (T=0) -0.010 -0.005 0.497
-1.477 -0.730
EBITD (T=1) 0.007 -0.013 0.473
0.764 -1.410
EBITD (T=2) 0.004 -0.014 0.454
0.489 -1.492
EBITD (T=3) -0.018 0.000 0.473
-1.897 -0.032
BL (T=-1) -0.089 0.006 0.372
-7.299 0.406
BL (T=0) -0.026 -0.001 0.738
-3.920 -0.173
BL (T=1) -0.016 -0.005 0.640
-1.909 -0.515
BL (T=2) -0.026 -0.007 0.559
-2.667 -0.678
BL (T=3) -0.017 -0.003 0.492
-1.539 -0.271
BL (T=4) -0.021 -0.005 0.463
-1.644 -0.356
BL (T=5) -0.006 -0.008 0.470
-0.455 -0.575
Cumulative Change in BL (T=1) -0.017 -0.004 0.419
-1.983 -0.475
Cumulative Change in BL (T=2) -0.026 -0.007 0.425
-2.679 -0.668
Cumulative Change in BL (T=3) -0.018 -0.003 0.424
-1.558 -0.284
Cumulative Change in BL (T=4) -0.020 -0.004 0.452
-1.639 -0.331













Change in BL (T=0) -0.026 -0.002 0.378
-3.832 -0.224
Change in BL (T=1) 0.006 0.000 0.138
0.824 0.016
Change in BL (T=2) -0.006 0.003 0.100
-0.839 0.361
Change in BL (T=3) 0.006 0.007 0.106
0.849 0.837
Change in BL (T=4) 0.000 -0.008 0.106
0.065 -1.049
Change in BL (T=5) 0.017 -0.009 0.124
2.009 -0.979
Net Debt Issues (T=1) -0.001 -0.011 0.135
-0.140 -1.183
Net Debt Issues (T=2) -0.002 -0.010 0.114
-0.254 -1.062
Net Debt Issues (T=3) 0.008 0.003 0.124
0.781 0.293
Net Debt Issues (T=4) 0.003 0.001 0.138
0.315 0.152
Net Debt Issues (T=5) 0.004 -0.032 0.132
0.341 -2.938
Net Equity Issues (T=1) -0.005 -0.025 0.204
-0.507 -2.517
Net Equity Issues (T=2) 0.007 -0.010 0.238
0.832 -0.990
Net Equity Issues (T=3) -0.009 -0.029 0.300
-0.943 -3.018
Net Equity Issues (T=4) -0.002 0.016 0.364
-0.200 1.553




Table 3.12: Robustness Test: Regressions with Abnormal Sales Percentage by SEC 
Receipt Date 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions 
on Abnormal Sales Percentage (percentage of insider sales in the six months prior to the 
SEO, minus the average percentage of insider sales in the year starting at two years prior 
to the SEO) and control variables.  Time of the insider trades is measured by the SEC 
Receipt Date. The specification of the models is the same as in Table 3.3 to Table 3.10, 
except for the measure of insider trading activities prior to the SEO.  Coefficients of the 
control variables are subsided from the tables.  Robust T-statistics are reported in italics. 
 
Dependent Variable Abnormal Sales Percentage R Square
Net Equity Issues (T=0) 0.014 0.674
1.794
Net Debt Issues (T=0) -0.026 0.136
-2.923
Change in Dividends (T=0) 0.000 0.912
1.910
Change in Cash Balance (T=0) 0.027 0.400
3.075
Change in Cash Balance (T=1) 0.007 0.131
0.709
Change in Cash Balance (T=2) 0.004 0.069
0.486
Change in Cash Balance (T=3) 0.009 0.065
0.923
Investment (T=0) 0.004 0.510
0.897
Investment (T=1) 0.006 0.507
1.288
Investment (T=2) 0.000 0.471
-0.054






Table 3.12: Robustness Test: Regressions with Abnormal Sales Percentage by SEC 
Receipt Date (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable Abnormal Sales Percentage R Square
EBITD (T=0) -0.012 0.497
-1.750
EBITD (T=1) -0.010 0.473
-1.224
EBITD (T=2) 0.006 0.454
0.725
EBITD (T=3) -0.001 0.471
-0.126
BL (T=-1) -0.081 0.368
-6.706
BL (T=0) -0.025 0.738
-3.824
BL (T=1) -0.019 0.640
-2.221
BL (T=2) -0.025 0.559
-2.648
BL (T=3) -0.018 0.492
-1.607
BL (T=4) -0.016 0.463
-1.322
BL (T=5) -0.004 0.470
-0.295
Cumulative Change in BL (T=1) -0.019 0.419
-2.325
Cumulative Change in BL (T=2) -0.026 0.424
-2.664
Cumulative Change in BL (T=3) -0.018 0.424
-1.615
Cumulative Change in BL (T=4) -0.019 0.452
-1.502





Table 3.12: Robustness Test: Regressions with Abnormal Sales Percentage by SEC 
Receipt Date (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable Abnormal Sales Percentage R Square
Change in BL (T=0) -0.025 0.378
-3.779
Change in BL (T=1) 0.003 0.138
0.410
Change in BL (T=2) -0.003 0.100
-0.495
Change in BL (T=3) 0.006 0.105
0.745
Change in BL (T=4) -0.004 0.105
-0.541
Change in BL (T=5) 0.014 0.121
1.647
Net Debt Issues (T=1) -0.006 0.135
-0.720
Net Debt Issues (T=2) 0.001 0.113
0.090
Net Debt Issues (T=3) 0.007 0.124
0.758
Net Debt Issues (T=4) 0.002 0.138
0.260
Net Debt Issues (T=5) 0.007 0.125
0.651
Net Equity Issues (T=1) -0.003 0.201
-0.335
Net Equity Issues (T=2) 0.009 0.238
0.963
Net Equity Issues (T=3) -0.007 0.295
-0.765
Net Equity Issues (T=4) -0.004 0.363
-0.451




Table 3.13: Robustness Test: Regressions with Abnormal Sales Percentage Adjusted for 
Firm Characteristics and Firm Fixed Effects 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regression of 
insider sales percentage on firm characteristics such as pre-issue stock run-up, the 
market-to-book ratio, and firm size, as well as firm fixed effects.  The specification of the 
models is the same as in Table 3.3 to Table 3.10, except for the measure of insider trading 
activities prior to the SEO.  Coefficients of the control variables are subsided from the 
tables.  Robust T-statistics are reported in italics. 
 
Dependent Variable
Abnormal Sales Percentage 
Adjusted for Firm 
Characteristics and Firm 
Fixed Effects R Square
Net Equity Issues (T=0) 0.027 0.610
1.536
Net Debt Issues (T=0) -0.004 0.124
-0.247
Change in Dividends (T=0) 0.031 0.898
1.121
Change in Cash Balance (T=0) 0.050 0.389
2.810
Change in Cash Balance (T=1) -0.030 0.162
-1.448
Change in Cash Balance (T=2) -0.010 0.127
-0.457
Change in Cash Balance (T=3) -0.001 0.093
-0.023
Investment (T=0) 0.003 0.491
0.369
Investment (T=1) 0.003 0.491
0.287
Investment (T=2) -0.009 0.465
-1.108
Investment (T=3) -0.005 0.447
-0.582
EBITD (T=0) 0.006 0.493
0.454
EBITD (T=1) -0.018 0.442
-1.016
EBITD (T=2) -0.034 0.461
-1.859




Table 3.13: Robustness Test: Regressions with Abnormal Sales Percentage Adjusted for 
Firm Characteristics and Firm Fixed Effects (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable
Abnormal Sales Percentage 
Adjusted for Firm 
Characteristics and Firm 
Fixed Effects R Square
BL (T=-1) -0.009 0.344
-0.342
BL (T=0) -0.018 0.739
-1.347
BL (T=1) 0.007 0.626
0.380
BL (T=2) -0.009 0.547
-0.449
BL (T=3) -0.018 0.487
-0.767
Change in BL (T=0) -0.018 0.333
-1.300
Cumulative Change in BL (T=1) 0.004 0.393
0.254
Cumulative Change in BL (T=2) -0.010 0.411
-0.528
Cumulative Change in BL (T=3) -0.019 0.413
-0.821
Net Debt Issues (T=1) -0.004 0.130
-0.246
Net Debt Issues (T=2) -0.008 0.099
-0.434
Net Debt Issues (T=3) -0.012 0.115
-0.587
Net Equity Issues (T=1) -0.032 0.208
-1.649
Net Equity Issues (T=2) -0.021 0.230
-1.148






Table 3.14: Robustness Test: Regressions with Pure Insider Sales 
This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the coefficients from the regressions 
on Pure Insider Sales (dummy which equals 1 for SEO firms with pure insider sales 
within the six month prior to the SEO) and control variables.  The specification of the 
models is the same as in Table 3.3 to Table 3.10, except for the measure of insider trading 
activities prior to the SEO.  Coefficients of the control variables are subsided from the 
tables.  Robust T-statistics are reported in italics. 
 
Dependent Variable Pure Insider Sales R Square
Net Equity Issues (T=0) 0.010 0.674
1.626
Net Debt Issues (T=0) -0.017 0.136
-2.628
Change in Dividends (T=0) 0.011 0.912
1.091
Change in Cash Balance (T=0) 0.022 0.401
3.217
Change in Cash Balance (T=1) 0.009 0.131
1.208
Change in Cash Balance (T=2) -0.005 0.069
-0.667
Change in Cash Balance (T=3) 0.009 0.066
1.167
Investment (T=0) 0.001 0.509
0.321
Investment (T=1) 0.004 0.507
1.221
Investment (T=2) 0.004 0.471
1.312
Investment (T=3) 0.002 0.457
0.693
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Table 3.14: Robustness Test: Regressions with Pure Insider Sales (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable Pure Insider sales R Square
EBITD (T=0) 0.001 0.498
0.225
EBITD (T=1) 0.001 0.474
0.220
EBITD (T=2) 0.002 0.453
0.311
EBITD (T=3) -0.002 0.471
-0.280
BL (T=-1) -0.038 0.355
-3.837
BL (T=0) -0.019 0.738
-3.611
BL (T=1) -0.011 0.640
-1.749
BL (T=2) -0.014 0.558
-1.835
BL (T=3) -0.018 0.493
-2.048
BL (T=4) -0.016 0.462
-1.611
BL (T=5) -0.008 0.470
-0.770
Cumulative Change in BL (T=1) -0.012 0.419
-1.785
Cumulative Change in BL (T=2) -0.014 0.423
-1.847
Cumulative Change in BL (T=3) -0.018 0.425
-2.015
Cumulative Change in BL (T=4) -0.015 0.452
-1.596




Table 3.14: Robustness Test: Regressions with Pure Insider Sales (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variable Pure Insider Sales R Square
Change in BL (T=0) -0.017 0.377
-3.393
Change in BL (T=1) 0.001 0.138
0.210
Change in BL (T=2) -0.002 0.100
-0.441
Change in BL (T=3) 0.000 0.105
0.037
Change in BL (T=4) -0.003 0.105
-0.515
Change in BL (T=5) 0.007 0.120
1.105
Net Debt Issues (T=1) 0.002 0.134
0.240
Net Debt Issues (T=2) -0.003 0.114
-0.460
Net Debt Issues (T=3) 0.002 0.124
0.243
Net Debt Issues (T=4) 0.002 0.138
0.239
Net Debt Issues (T=5) -0.007 0.125
-0.791
Net Equity Issues (T=1) -0.006 0.201
-0.826
Net Equity Issues (T=2) -0.003 0.237
-0.458
Net Equity Issues (T=3) -0.010 0.296
-1.369
Net Equity Issues (T=4) 0.011 0.364
1.432
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